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Abstract
Central and Eastern Europe(CEE) is the region where the ownership of banks has been through
the most fundamental and massive changes during the past two decades. This paper analyses the role of
state-ownership in commercial banks, whether and why state ownership imposes negative effects on
commercial banks in CEE transition countries, through both theoretical arguments and empirical
testings.
The thesis summarizes previous literature and analyses the role of banking ownership and
performance, particularly though a dynamic view of the banking privatisation process. It investigates
the reasons why state-owned banks are harmful in CEE countries from a corporate governance point of
view. Followed by empirical tests on this topic, including banking production efficiency measurement
using Stochastic Frontier Analysis and second-stage regression analysis about the effects of ownership
on banking efficiency and asset quality.
This paper finds out that the state ownership of banks imposes negative effects on bank
performance and hinders successful privatisation of enterprises. Banking production efficiency has
been improving greatly in late 1990s and stayed at a constant high level in 2000s. Through panel data
regressions, we find the negative effects of state-ownership on banking production efficiency and asset
quality. Foreign bank participation proves to be useful and the only viable option for most CEE
countries. Instead of ownership, the most crucial role of governments in banking is the strong and
independent regulation and supervision over the banking industry. This thesis contributes to the
rethinking of state-ownership in commercial banks and draws policy implications for China based on
CEE experience.
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91. Introduction
1.1. The Background
Over the past twenty years, there have been tremendous changes in the banking industry in the
transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), due to the massive privatisation and
liberalisation process. The state-owned mono-bank system, a typical product of central-planning
economy, has been transformed into a market-based competitive banking system with high degree of
foreign bank participation. The governments in these transition countries, had relinquished direct
ownership of commercial banks, and sold large amount of shares to foreign banks.
Pre-transition banking sectors in CEE were designed to meet the needs of centrally planned
economies. Banks were not real profit-driven banks, but part of state apparatus, directly controlling the
credit and capital allocation from savers to borrowers (usually state-owned enterprises), for purposes of
investment and working capital needs which are necessary to meet the national output plan. In most
centrally planned economies, the big state-owned banks were usually large specialty banks performing
specific national policy functions. For example, an agricultural bank was for providing fund to the
agricultural sector; a construction bank was for financing long-term capital projects and infrastructure
development; a state savings bank was for collecting virtually all household deposits through an
extensive branch network; a foreign trade bank was for handling all transactions involving foreign
currency. Theoretically, the problem is not about state-ownership in development or policy banks, as
certain national strategic sectors need government support through bank financing. The problem is the
state-ownership in “commercial banks”. There were no real commercial banks in centrally planned
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economies, because when government became the ultimate owners of banks with the majority shares of
total assets in an economy, banks were merely the tools serving the central planning of the government
and all banking services were segmented along functional lines serving relevant development and
policy goals of the state.
Thus the topic is about the role of state ownership in commercial banks, whether and why state
ownership imposes negative effects on commercial banking. Central and Eastern Europe is the region
where the ownership of banks has been through the most fundamental and massive changes during the
past two decades. This makes the topic extremely interesting in the studies of transition economies.
The transformation of the banking system in CEE countries was characterized by completion of
debt consolidation, restructuring and privatisation of state-owned banks, elimination of the restrictions
on domestic and foreign market entries and development of regulatory frameworks and supervision.
1.2. Purpose and Limitations
Now banking privatisation has almost been completed in most CEE countries, so it is time to look
back and rethink the twenty years' experience and to assess whether relinquishing state-ownership is
beneficial for banking performance enhancement. It is an interesting phenomenon regarding the
changing role of government in commercial banks. It is the same government, who, on one hand, gave
up ownership of banks, on the other hand, spent enormous efforts building an efficient banking system
and strengthening regulation. The CEE banking transition has been triggering some doubts about
11
whether the mode of CEE banking transition is appropriate in methods and sustainable after
privatisation. The drastic decrease of state ownership in banks was accompanied by huge wave of
foreign bank entry, signifying a seemingly withdraw of government intervention. However,
government did not step back from the stage and disappear in the world of commercial banking. The
most crucial role of governments in banking is the strong and independent regulation and supervision
over the banking industry, not only during the privatisation process, but also in the years after the
completion of the transformation.
Overtime, as process of market mechanism replacing central-planning system unfolded, the role
of governments in banking industry of those countries have been changing; new financial market,
institutions and channels of lending have been established; European integration has achieved great
progress; CEE banking industry is more closely connected with Western European banks and economic
conditions. However, as a "by-product" of market economy, market failures became inevitable, this
also demands the government to switch its role from direct control to regulation and supervision.
Prudential regulations and supervisory systems are crucial to protect what privatisation has already
achieved and sustain the future financial and economic stability.
Another significance of this topic lies in the fact that banking performance is extremely important
for overall financial development in CEE countries. Since the money and capital markets of CEE
economies are still in the early stage of development, the financial systems in this region are primarily
bank-based. Banks play a key role in financing of industries, financial development and economic
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growth. Thus it is important to study how ownership could affect banking performance, for the purpose
of creating better functioning banking systems.
This issue is not only an issue which CEE countries had faced before, but it is still important
nowadays, in other transition countries and even in developed countries. As the biggest transition
economy, China's "Big Four" state owned banks have been receiving lots of attention. Especially
during the recent financial crisis, when numerous global financial giants went into difficulties and
could only seek government bailout, Chinese banks, on the contrary, seemed to be performing quite
well. All these make the state-ownership in commercial banks an interesting and prevalent topic again.
This paper aims to explore this topic mainly in the context of Central and Eastern European
transition countries, to analyse the role of state ownership in commercial banks, why government
should cede ownership in commercial banks, the methods of privatisation, and the relationship between
ownership of banks and banking production efficiency in CEE countries. In the end, this paper seeks to
draw valuable implications for the big state-owned banks in China, based on CEE experience.
The purpose of the paper is to contribute to the existing research on the topic in three aspects:
First, there are enormous empirical literature on bank ownership and performance, however, there
are very few papers analysing "why" state ownership in banks is harmful for bank performance,
especially from a corporate governance perspective, drawing on the problems of enterprise
privatisation and its link with the process of bank ownership change in CEE;
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Second, another gap is that most of the empirical tests on transition economies are conducted
mostly in early 2000s, however, as the results of privatisation may take a long time to really emerge,
the previous papers might not have included long enough periods to fully test their hypotheses;
Finally, with the main focus on CEE countries, this paper also aims to draw implications for other
countries, based on CEE experience. The issue of state-ownership in banks is still important nowadays.
Despite the trend toward financial industry liberalisation in recent years, state ownership of financial
institutions is still widespread. Especially the banking crises of the 1990s and 2000s even led to re-
nationalisations of banks in some countries. Thereof, this paper aims to contribute to the rethinking of
state-ownership in commercial banks, and to draw implications for China after a compare and contrast
analysis of CEE and Chinese banking privatisation, providing some insights into how state-owned
financial institutions can be transformed into viable financial institutions that are crucial elements in
achieving greater financial intermediation and economic development in transition countries.
The limitations regarding ownership and corporate governance studies are usually related to data
availability. As Bankscope only provides ownership data for the latest financial year, it is extremely
difficult to collect ownership data for individual bank in each year, especially considering the massive
wave of M&A activities occurred in this region. Therefore, this paper uses country-level ownership
measurements to access the effects of state-ownership on banking efficiency. Very few papers have
done similar studies using aggregated data.
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1.3. Structure of the Thesis
The thesis is structured as follows: the following Chapter 2 is a review of the existing literature on
government ownership of banks including both the positive and negative views, the state-ownership
and non-performing loans, what has been done in the previous empirical studies, and formulates the
hypotheses. Chapter 3 narrows down the topic to the context of Central and Eastern Europe,
summarises previous literature and analyses the role of banking ownership and performance,
particularly though a dynamic view of the banking privatisation process; at the end of chapter 3, three
hypotheses of the thesis are formed. Chapter 4 explains the reasons why state-owned banks are harmful
in CEE countries from a corporate governance point of view, followed by Chapter 5 analysing the
solutions to the problem of state-owned banks. Chapter 6 is about empirical tests on this topic,
including banking production efficiency measurement and second-stage regressions. Chapter 7 draws
policy implications for Chinese banking system, based on CEE experience. The final chapter concludes
the thesis and marks out some research prospects in the future.
15
2. Literature review:
2. 1. Definitions of State Ownership of Commercial Banks
The state ownership of banks can be incorporated in the grand picture of state intervention in banks.
There are different methods and degrees of state control over banks, varying from extremely light
influence to all encompassing control, from highly interventionist regulations and even outright
government ownership to episodes of “free” banking (Barth, Caprio and Levine, 2006, p.18) In most
countries, the level of regulatory intervention in banking has increased dramatically relative to that in
other sectors since the Great Depression (Calomiris, 2003. p.32).
Among all the forms of government control over banks, the most direct and complete form is
outright ownership - actually becoming the dominant shareholder of banks. The definitions of "bank"
in this paper need to be made clear at first. There are different types of banks, with varying goals and
rules. Central banks, with special responsibility of regulating and supervising commercial banks, as
well as controlling money supply and interest rates, are normally state-owned. Central bank is the
symbol of a state in national economy, providing liquidity to financial markets and serving as the
lender of last resort in economic crises. Development banks, different from either central banks or
commercial banks, serve as a tool for government to foster economic development and to facilitate
export or certain strategic industries. They derive their funds mainly from the government, other
financial institutions and supranational organizations. They often concentrated on specific groups of
borrowers. (Levine, Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt, 2000)
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In this paper, the focus is on the state-ownership of commercial banks. A commercial bank is a
financial institution that collects credit from lenders in the form of deposits, makes personal or business
loans and offers related financial services.1
This paper is not against general state-ownership of banks, it should be distinguished that state
ownership should be displaced in the correct place. There is nothing wrong with government goals such
as welfare and job creation. The problem is the conflict of government aims with rules of commercial
banking when the state actually owns commercial banks. The governments should make an efforts in
establishing other institutions such as policy banks of various types (e.g. Development Banks, Export
Banks) to achieve their goals, instead of manipulating commercial banks for other purposes against
prudential banking rules.
2. 2. Government Ownership of Commercial Banks - General Theories
2.2.1. Optimistic View:
The arguments about state ownership in commercial banks have existed since a long time ago. Some
early scholars held an optimistic view towards the role of government in banks. They noted that market
failures are inevitable in free market economy, and the existence of imperfect information makes it
difficult to motivate private banks to operate for the goal of social optimism. The public interest view
argues that government ownership of banks could facilitate the mobilisation of savings and the
allocation of those savings toward strategic projects with long-term beneficial effects on an economy,
1 Based on definitions on: http://www.investorwords.com/955/commercial_bank.html, accessed on 15th April, 2010
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whereas private banks would only allocate credit in line with potentially short-run private interests in
mind. According to this view, governments have adequate information and sufficient incentives to
ensure socially desirable investments. (Barth, Caprio, Levine, 2006, p. 18) Consequently, government
ownership of banks would help economies overcome capital market failures, exploit externalities, and
invest in strategic sectors. Lewis (1950), Myrdal (1968), and Gerschenkron (1962) specifically
advocated government ownership of banks to promote economic and financial development, especially
in underdeveloped countries. Gerschenkron (1962) focuses on the necessity of financial development
for economic growth. He argues the well-functioning institution is a prerequisite for resign of indirect
state ownership in banks. Comparing developed and backward economies, he argues that privately
owned commercial bank was the crucial vehicle providing capital for industries in several
industrialising countries in the second half of the 19th century, especially Germany; however, in some
countries where economic institutions were not sufficiently developed, state-owned banks played a
more important role. (Russia as an example) In such countries, the government could step in and,
through its financial institutions, jump start both financial and economic development. Gerschenkron
(1962, p. 20) considers government financing of industrialisation in Russia a great success.
Governments can intervene in corporate financing in a variety of ways: providing subsidies directly,
influencing private banks through regulation and supervision to lend to politically desirable projects, or
actually owning dominant or partial shares of financial institutions. The advantage of actual owning
banks—as opposed to regulating banks or owning all projects outright—is that ownership allows
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extensive government control over the choice of projects being financed while leaving the
implementation of these projects to the private sector. (La Porta, 2002)
Besides Gerschenkron's view stated above, there was a broader range of arguments in developed
economics which advocated government ownership of firms in the strategic economic sectors2,
Hawtrey (1926), for example, noted the "strategic" advantages of the nationalisation of banks, besides
other key industries in economy, such as utilities, coal mines, and education. (Lewis, 1950, p. 26)
explicitly advocates government ownership of banks, as part of the "commanding heights" approach
whereby the government would develop certain strategic industries through both direct ownership and
control over finance. Myrdal (1968. p. 135) is sympathetic toward government ownership of banks in
India and other Asian countries. These ideas were widely adopted around the world, especially in
developing countries, as governments in the 1960s and the 1970s nationalised the existing commercial
banks and established new ones in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. (La Porta, 2002)
Another recent view arguing state-owned banks should be endorsed is due to the fear that
privately owned banks would concentrate credit in the hands of the few and the profit-driven private
banks tend to take more risks, which might threaten financial sector stability. (World Bank, 2001)
2.2.2. Pessimistic view
2 See Shleifer (1998) for a summary, the following is also summarised by Shleifer (1998).
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It is not difficult to notice that most academic work of the optimistic view emerged quite a long
time ago. With time passing by, more and more scholars notice the disadvantages of state-owned banks.
Nowadays, the pessimistic view towards direct government control over commercial banks is prevalent
in both academic and policy spheres. The optimistic view advocates state ownership mainly based on
the social aims of state-owned banks, while the pessimistic stream of theories argues government direct
intervention from a "political" view. This stream of thoughts emphasizes political rather than social
objectives of government intervention. As guided by political pursuits, governments do not have
sufficient incentives to ensure economically desirable investments, but rather to intervene in banks
towards politically satisfactory behaviours. This view argues that, governments need to control banks
and enterprises for certain political purposes, such as to keep certain level of stable employment to
ensure its legitimacy, to provide subsidies and other benefits to supporters, who are politically or
economically associated with governments and might return the favor in the form of votes, political
contributions, and bribes.3 Thus government ownership of banks tends to politicize lending behaviors
and soften budget constraints, resulting in bad asset quality and low efficiency of banks, and ultimately
the slow down of economic development.
This phenomenon is easy to identify especially in countries with underdeveloped financial systems,
poorly established institutions, lack of protected property rights, and high level of corruption. This view
3 see Kornai (1979), Shleifer and Vishny (1994).
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of state ownership is strengthened by considerable studies analysing the inefficiency of government
enterprises, the political motives behind public provision of services, and the benefits of privatisation.4
The incentives of government in banks include different dimensions. Instead of pure profit-driven
incentive, government has other social and political goals such as keeping employment, retaining
political power, controlling strategic resources, and etc. Thus, state-owned banks tend to facilitate the
financing of politically attractive projects, but not necessarily economically efficient ones. On the other
side, the private sector has limited ownership in banks, leading to limited incentive of monitoring state-
owned banks. The dual role of state both as an owner and a regulator creates a conflict situation for
governments to supervise the banks they control. The result is usually that state-owned banks would
not be subject to any monitoring at all, which is the main reason of low efficiency and the diversion of
state capital to satisfy a variety of private interests (World Bank, 2001).
2.2.3. State Ownership and Non-Performing Loan (NPL) Problem
The rate of Non-Performing Loans is an indicator of asset portfolio quality of a commercial bank.
The aggregate rate of NPL is commonly used by international regulatory and supervisory bodies (such
as IMF, World Bank and BIS) to assess the performance of the banking sector in relevant countries.
There have been lots of papers analysing the link between state-owned banks and NPLs. Novaes
and Werlang (1995) report lower performance for state-owned banks in Brazil and Argentina due to
4 e.g., Megginson, Nash, and Randenborgh (1994), Barberis et al. (1996), Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997), Frydman et al.
(1999), La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes (1999)
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high proportion of NPLs generated by government borrowing. Salas and Saurina (2002), based on
Spanish data, find out that ownership is one significant variable affecting credit risk of banks. They
argue that state-owned banks have stronger incentive to fund riskier projects and to provide favorable
credits for small and medium firms, in order to boost economic growth. This risk taking behaviour will
lead to a higher level of NPLs. Later, after examining 50000 financial institutions with different
ownership types across 119 countries, Micco et al. (2004) find that the level of NPLs tend to be higher
for state-owned than private-owned banks, which can be explained that state-owned banks pursue
development goals rather than pure economic profits, especially in developing economies, thus their
credit recovery capacity is weaker than private-owned banks.
However, in a bank with large quantities of both state and private shares, the interaction between
private and state shareholding could determine the risk level taken by banks. Hu et al. (2004) argue that
unjustified risky behavior is lower when the two groups check and balance each other; On the opposite,
when private and state shareholders collude (especially in societies with little civil disciplines),
problem loans will be higher due to risky credit offering. Garciýa-Marco and Robles-Fernàndez (2007)
examine the relationship between risk taking and ownership structure. They argued that commercial
banks (mainly private owned) are more exposed to risk than deposit banks (mainly state owned).
2.3. Empirical Studies on Government Ownership of Banks
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There have been various empirical papers studying government ownership of banks, including both
single country studies and cross-country analysis.
Sapienza (1999) finds that Italian state-owned banks pursue political objectives in their lending
policies, consistent with the political view. Barth, Caprio, and Levine (1999) present a comprehensive
database on government regulation of banks around the world. They conclude that state ownership of
banks tends to be associated with more poorly-developed banks, other financial institutions and stock
markets. In a later paper, Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001) use data on bank ownership from
Bankscope, and find that greater government ownership is generally associated with less efficient and
less-developed financial systems.
One of the most influential empirical studies on government ownership of banks is the paper
produced by LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2002). They collect data on government
ownership of banks from various sources for 92 countries around the world, across a wide span of years
from 1970s to 1990s. Firstly, they found out that government ownership of banks is large and pervasive
around the world from 1970s until even 1990s. Second, in accordance with both the development and
political theories stated above, and confirmed by other scholars5, they point out that government
ownership is closely associated with some problems that afflict developing countries, with
characteristics such as low levels of GDP per capita, underdeveloped financial systems, interventionist
and inefficient public sectors, and poor protection of property rights. These findings are also consistent
with Gerschenkron's (1962) idea that less developed countries with poor institutions tend to have state-
5 See Barth et al. (2004); Beck et al.(2004); Berger et al.(2004) and Dinc (2005)
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owned banks. Third, they found out that government ownership of banks in 1970s is associated with
slower subsequent financial development; and finally, government ownership of banks is associated
with lower subsequent growth of per capita income, and in particular with lower productivity growth
rather than slower factor accumulation.
These findings generally support the political perspective on the consequences of government
intervention in banks as state ownership politicizes the resource allocation process and reduces
efficiency.
One possible flaw of La Porta's paper, is that its results are fragile to extending the set of
conditioning variables to include more ‘fundamental’ determinants of economic growth such as
institutional quality and quality of governance (e.g. Acemoglu et al, 2005), which previous empirical
literature has found to be significant.6
The empirical papers summarised above mainly focus on the relation between bank ownership and
macro-level indicators, such as financial development and economic growth. Even though some of
them used bank-level data, but the emphasis is on the link between macroeconomic conditions and
bank ownership. On a micro level, there are also lots of empirical papers exploring the ownership of
banks.
Mian (2003) uses Bankscope data for about one hundred developing countries, reports evidence
of the weak performance of state-owned banks, and suggests that this result is related to weak
6 e.g. Knack and Keefer, 1995; Hall and Jones, 1999; Acemoglu et al, 2001; Rodrik et al, 2004; Demetriades and Law, 2006.
Also see summary in "Andrianova,S., Demetriades,P. and Shortland,A., 2009."
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incentives and political corruption. The data used in these papers, however, do not cover all banks
operating in an economy.7
Sapienza(1999) finds that the chairs of state-owned banks affiliate to certain political parties and
this affiliation has a positive impact on the interest rate discount given by state-owned banks in
provinces with stronger associated party. The empirical results in Dinc (2005) suggest that state-owned
banks increase lending in election years compared to private banks in major emerging markets in the
1990s, and these lending behaviours are more driven by political motivations other pure efficiency and
profit purposes. Brown and Dinc (2005) find that failing banks are much less likely to be taken over by
the government or to lose their licenses before elections than after. In addition, Khwaja and Mian (2005)
provide evidence that in Pakistan, firms with politicians on their boards receive larger loans from
government banks and these loans tend to have higher default rates.
To sum up, previous papers on government ownership of banks can be classified into three
categories: first, papers examining the effect of government ownership on the financial and economic
development of various countries (e.g. La Porta et al., 2002); second, papers examining the difference
in lending behavior between state-owned and privately-owned banks for a particular country (e.g.,
Sapienza (2004) and Khwaja and Mian (2005)); third, papers investigating the change in behavior of
government-owned banks relative to privately-owned banks around some particular event such as
elections in various countries (e.g. Dinc (2005) ).
7 La Porta et al. use only the ten largest banks, whereas the coverage of the Bankscope data varies from country to country
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The literature review above deals both theoretically and empirically with state ownership of
banks all over the world. Less competition, greater political intervention and weaker corporate
governance are strong theoretical arguments against state ownership, but it does not necessarily mean
that privatisation will solve all these problems. The same government actors responsible for the poor
performance of state-owned banks are also responsible for the design and execution of the privatisation
program. Political objectives, poor information, and principal-agent problems could prevent the
privatised firm from performing as well as a de novo private bank or foreign green-field bank. Besides,
transition countries have special characteristics different from developed countries and other
developing countries.
In the context of privatisation process, the state ownership of banks imposes negative effects on
bank performance and hinders successful privatisation of enterprises. Normally, even in developed
countries, it is not impossible to have state-owned banks, but in the transition process of CEE countries,
new problems emerged in the state-owned banks. Large literature has analysed the banking
privatisation process and the general disadvantages of state-owned banks, however, very few has
explained the changing role of state-owned banks in transition process in great depth.
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3. Ownership change and bank performance in privatisation process
First of all, we should distinguish those interconnected concepts used in literature: developing
countries, transition countries and emerging economies.
It should be noted that a number of studies examine privatisation in developing nations that are not
transition economies. Developing country is a term generally used to describe a nation with a low level
of material well being. The World Bank considers all low- and middle- income countries as
"developing".8
In the context of economics, a key factor to define a transition country is that the economy is
changing from central planning economy to market based economy. Transition countries are supposed
to go through certain process, such as economic liberalisation, where prices are determined by market
mechanism instead of central planning apparatus, trade barriers are removed, state-owned enterprises
are privatised, and a modern efficient financial sector is created to serve as the channel for the
movement of private capital. The process has been applied in Central and Eastern Europe, which used
to be in the former Soviet Union and Communist bloc, China, and many other countries. The key to
successful transition is usually the essential change in the role of the state, which means the creation of
fundamentally different governments and institutions, to promote private-owned enterprises, markets
and independent financial institutions.
8 See World Bank website: http://www.worldbank.org/depweb/english/beyond/global/glossary.html accessed on 9th, May,
2010
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3.1. Process of bank privatisation in Central and Eastern European countries
In the early stage of economic transition, it was recognised that privatisation will not be successful
without an efficient banking system. An economic system with a high level of information asymmetry
and an inefficient legal system lacking satisfactory sanction instruments for concluding contracts are
destined to create an environment in which the banking sector develops faster than the capital market.
According to Bonin and Wachtel (1999), there are basically three stages of banking privatisation
in CEE: the first is establishing separately commercial banks as joint stock companies and a central
bank, breaking Soviet-era mono bank system; the second stage is restructuring of bank portfolios and
recapitalisation of banks, to deal with bad loan problems; the third is the final privatisation, a transfer
of ownership from the government.
Most of the transition countries took identical steps in the first stage of transition, when a two-tier
banking system was created from a monobank that performed both central and commercial banking
activities under a command economy. A separation of central and commercial banking was identical
for most of the former communist countries undergoing banking sector transformation. Commercial
banking operations were carved out of the monobank and its asset and liabilities transferred to newly
created commercial banks (Buch, 1996). This process was followed by further expansion and openness
of banking systems.
Saunders and Sommariva (1993) analyse the difficulties of transferring from state control to a
market system with specific reference to Eastern Europe. They address various restructuring
approaches including recapitalisation, “loan hospitals” (bad bank approach), and various types of debt-
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for-debt and equity-for-debt exchange. Their analysis demonstrates clearly the difficulty of managing
and dealing with only one problem in the bank privatization process, namely the troubled loan issue in
the monobank systems. Bonin and Wachtel (1998b) provide an excellent analysis of the difficulties of
achieving market-based banking systems in transition economies. They emphasize that bank
privatisation is only one step in the long and painful process of disengaging the state from virtually
complete control over the banking system.
Other studies on the process of bank privatisation in Eastern Europe is provided in Abarbanell and
Bonin (1997), Abarbanell and Meyendorff (1997), Snyder and Kormendi (1997), Svejnar (1997), and
Thorne (1993). These studies provide evidence of the difficulty of bank privatisation in economies in
transition from central planned economies to market economies, making bank privatisation even more
difficult because of the problems of political instability, lack of banking expertise in the financial
system and in the economy overall, difficulties in assessing the depth of troubled loans (estimated as
high as 50% of total loans in some cases), the problem of carving up the monobank system into a
competitive system, and the inherent problem of placing a value on the organisation to be privatised.
Meyendorff and Snyder (1997) study the "transactional structures" of banking privatisations in
CEE, and they identified three elements: (1) antecedent actions that determine the characteristics of the
unit being privatized; (2) ownership transfer and governance after privatisation; and (3) follow-on
actions and ongoing government intervention. They note that most governments in the region made
similar policy choices when they started privatising their banking systems, which have proven highly
detrimental over time. For example, most governments chose not to seriously break up the socialist
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monobank system or severely restricted new competition, particularly foreign banks from entering. For
these reasons, the former monobanks retain dominant market shares in most of the transition economies
almost a decade after reforms were initiated. Further, none of the politically-feasible ownership transfer
methods (voucher privatisation, insider sales, etc.) brought in new capital or talent, so the banking
systemsall in this region still remained weak and uncompetitive.
However, after the creation of two-tier banking system, during the second and third stages,
methods taken for the aim of developing a viable and efficient banking sector varied among transition
economies and were dependent on a number of endogenous and exogenous factors. The most important
factors were the starting conditions, macroeconomic environment and the pace of other reforms, such
as enterprise restructuring, institutional and legal reform, and the last but not least, the political
consensus in support of market-based institutions. Macroeconomic conditions and the microeconomic
restructuring process have become fundamental factors affecting the development, stability and
soundness of banking systems.
The transformation of banking systems was accomplished either by the rehabilitation approach or
the new entry approach. The former was predominantly based on recapitalisation and consolidation of
state banks including the gradual privatisation. This approach was used in Hungary, Poland and, to
some extent, in the Czech Republic and Slovak Republic. (Assaf, Barros and Matousek, 2009)
The new entry approach for developing the banking sector, used by the Baltic States and other
countries of the former Soviet Union, is based on relatively unrestricted entry of new banks, including
rapid privatisation.
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Banking is a regulated industry so that the agency framework is more relevant to the relationship
between the regulator and the bank. Second, market discipline is presumed to be imposed on banks
mainly through the appropriate pricing of risk by depositors. With the correct combination of
regulation and competition, ownership will not matter if management has little opportunity for rent
seeking. Hence, differences in performances across banks of varying ownership types may reflect more
their different objectives than different levels of efficiency. (Bonin 2005b)
3.2. Previous Studies on the Relationship between Bank Ownership and Performance during
Privatisation Process
A number of studies examine the relationship between bank ownership and performance during
privatisation period in transition economies, but the findings are mixed.
On the Micro-level, some scholars have conducted country-specific studies such as Croatia9, the
Czech Republic10, Hungary11, and Poland12. These studies, which examine the relationship between
bank ownership and performance and association between ownership and efficiency, produce mixed
results. For instance, Hasan and Marton (2003), Jemric and Vujcic (2002), and Weill (2003) find that
bank efficiency is positively related to foreign as opposed to state ownership, while Nikiel and Opiela
observe that foreign banks are less profit efficient than domestic private banks. Further, Kraft and
Tirtiroglu document that newly established banks are less efficient but offer better profit performance
9 See Kraft and Tirtiroglu, (1998); Jemric and Vujcic, (2002).
10 See Matousek and Taci, (2002); Weill, (2003).
11 See Hasan and Marton, (2003).
12 See Nikiel and Opiela, (2002); Weill, (2003)
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than either privatized or state-owned banks, whereas Jemric and Vujcic find that new banks are more
efficient.
On the macro-level, a number of cross-country studies also investigate the impact of ownership on
banking in transition countries. While these empirical studies vary in terms of the countries and periods
under analysis, as in the single-country studies they also focus on Central and Eastern Europe. In
investigating the determinants of bank efficiency and performance, Grigorian and Manole (2002),
Yildirim and Philippatos (2002), and Bonin et al. (2005a,b) all find that foreign-owned banks are
significantly more cost efficient than domestic banks. Bonin et al. (2002) Examine the impact of
ownership structure (state, private and foreign ownership) on bank performance in the six transition
economies of Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania. Their sample has
222 observations with financial and ownership data from these six countries for the years 1999 and
2000. The authors find robust evidence that profitability—measured by return on assets and return on
equity—is higher for fully private banks than for banks with some state ownership, and is the highest of
all for wholly foreign-owned banks. Foreign banks also experience the most rapid increase in customer
loans.
In addition, Bonin et al. (2005b) find that government-owned banks are least efficient and
Grigorian and Manole (2006) report that private banks which are established during the transition
process are no more cost efficient than old banks established before. Drakos (2002) concludes that
foreign entry could improve the overall performance of the banking system.
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Cross-country evidence from transitional economies also suggests foreign acquisition of state-
owned banks has an important effect on post privatisation performance. While privately owned banks
are unambiguously more efficient than government banks in a study of 11 transitional economies
(Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Croatia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovenia,
Slovakia), foreign-owned banks outperformed other private banks in the chosen countries. Foreign
bank entry has generated more competitive and efficient banking systems in these countries and this is
associated with higher GDP growth as well. (Bonin, Hasan and Wachtel 2003).
Fries and Taci (2005) looked at a more detailed breakdown of bank ownership. They find that
private banks are more efficient than state-owned banks, and that privatised banks with majority
foreign ownership are the most efficient while the banks with majority domestic ownership are the least
efficient. In summary, the research on the impact of transitions from a planned economy to a market
economy on a country's banking system indicate that both foreign ownership and private ownership can
generate better performance than state ownership. Clarke et al. (2005) find that some measures of bank
performance improved as a result of privatisation in CEE countries.
Indirect evidence on the effects of timing, and in particular the costs of delay, comes from
comparisons of transition countries. As analysed by Cull, Matesova, and Shirley (2002), Hungary
moved most decisively to privatise state-owned banks as early as in the first half of 1990s, and
permitted the large wave of foreign entry. The strategy paid off and provided the country with a strong,
stable banking system long before its neighbors. However, speed only is not sufficient to ensure
success of bank privatisation. The Czech government was quick to sell some of its ownership stakes in
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the four large state-owned banks that dominated the financial system, but they also chose to retain a
controlling interest in these banks. There was no obvious performance improvement, as the banks
maintained their old links with their most influential former clients, who were often borrowing to
channel funds into their private uses or to support unproductive firms. It was not until in the late 1990s
when a second round of bank privatisation largely reduced state-ownership in those banks that
performance obviously improved. In the case of Poland, the government adopted a more gradual path
moved more slowly than in the Czech Republic, but they avoided the tough situation incurred due to
mass privatisation of firms during early 1990s as the case in Czech Republic.
Green et al. (2004) modeled the efficiency of domestic and foreign banks in Central and Eastern
Europe, in terms of economies of scale and scope. They estimated and tested the model on a panel of
273 foreign and domestic banks located in nine European transition economies during 1995–99. They
rejected the hypothesis that foreign banks are more efficient than domestic banks in these economies,
and foreign ownership is hardly an important factor in reducing the banks’ total costs.
Table 3.1 summarised the empirical work on banking efficiency in transition countries.
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Source: Author's compilation based on relevant papers
Table 3.1: Summary of Results from Panel Data Studies on Banking Efficiency in Transition
Economies
Grigorian &
Manole (2006)
Yildirim &
Philippatos
(2002)
Rossi, Schwaiger
& Winkler
(2004)
Bonin, Hasan &
Wachtel (2005)
Fries & Taci
(2005)
Sample 1995-1998 1993-2000 1995-2002 1996-2000 1994-2001
Number of banks 585 325 272 225 289
Number of
observations 1074 2042 1070 856 1897
Number of countries 17 12 9 11 15
Methods DEA SFA & DFA SFA SFA SFA
Efficiency types DEA(1)-profitgeneration Cost and Profit Cost and Profit Cost and Profit Cost
DEA(2)-service
provision
Mean efficiency
Cost 0.39-0.71 DFA-0.72; SFA-0.76 0.36-0.87 0.41-0.78 0.40-0.75
Profit N/A DFA-0.66; SFA-0.5 0.32-0.71 0.5-0.82 N/A
Country-level factors
GDP growth Positive Positive N/A N/A Insignificant
Inflation rate Insignificant N/A N/A N/A N/A
Monetary depth Insignificant N/A N/A N/A Positive
Stock market
capitalisation Positive N/A N/A N/A N/A
Market concentration Positive Negative(cost);Positive(profit) N/A N/A Insignificant
Banking sector reform Positive N/A N/A N/A Positive(level);Negative(squared)
Non-banking sector
reform Positive N/A N/A N/A N/A
Interest rate Insignificant N/A N/A N/A Positive
Bank-level factors
Capitalisation Positive Negative(cost);Insignificant(profit) N/A Positive Positive
Foreign ownership Positive Positive(cost);Negative(profit) N/A Positive Positive
Total assets (in log) N/A Positive(cost);Negative(profit) N/A N/A N/A
Share of loans N/A Positive(cost);Negative(profit) N/A N/A N/A
Share of non-loan assets N/A N/A N/A N/A Negative
Share of non-performing
loans N/A N/A N/A N/A Negative
Deposit market share of
banks N/A N/A N/A N/A Positive
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3.3. Summary of Literature and Formed Hypotheses
To sum up, contrary to the optimistic view, lots of literature has argued the negative effects of
government ownership in banks. It might be expected that governments act quickly to phase out state
ownership of banks. However, during the privatisation period in CEE, some countries decreased state
ownership very quickly, while others had been reluctant and maintained certain level of state
ownership for some time. Besides, the banking crises of the 1990s and 2000s even led to re-
nationalisations in some countries. This triggers the old yet still important topic: what is the role of
state ownership in commercial banks?
The questions remain to be further explored such as why state ownership imposes strong negative
effects on bank performance in CEE region, whether and under what circumstances privatisation of
banks will improve performance and what factors determine the design and timing of privatisation.
Even though there has been lots of literature discussing those issues, very rare of those have used the
most recent data for empirical testings on this topic because of data availability restraints. However,
privatisation usually takes a long time to yield gains, because more time may be required by
management to overcome the organisational inertia and resistance to change that are common
characteristics of newly privatised firms (Otchere, 2005). Therefore, only with more observable years
available, it becomes possible to analyse the different patterns of bank performance improvement
before and post privatisation.
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Formed Hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: State ownership in commercial banks harms privatisation results in CEE countries.
Hypothesis 1 will be tested both theoretically and empirically in later chapters. For the theoretical
analysis, this paper differentiates itself from massive other papers dealing with state-ownership and
bank performance, through the perspective of corporate governance view (including corporate
governance issues both in banks and newly-privatised enterprises)
Hypothesis 2: Bank efficiency improves as a result of state-ownership phasing out in commercial
banks.
Hypothesis 2 will be tested by empirical analysis, starting with the measurement of banking
production efficiency, followed by second stage regression tests.
Hypothesis 3: Selling State-Owned banks to foreign strategic investors is the best way of
privatisation for CEE banks and foreign bank participation improves bank performance.
Hypothesis 3 will be tested by both theoretical argument and empirical testings. Then the proved
hypothesis can be helpful drawing implications for other transition countries facing similar and
different situations.
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4. Why State-Owned Banks are Harmful in CEE countries - From a Corporate
Governance Point of View
Based on literature review and CEE privatisation process review, it is reasonable to assume that
state ownership brings about negative influences over bank performance. The question is why state
ownership is problematic in CEE Countries, especially during privatisation period.
For the first hypothesis, besides general theories above, this paper provides some detailed analysis
in the context of CEE countries from a enterprise corporate governance point of view, which is lacking
in literature.
The performance of banking sector is closely connected with corporate sector. Especially in CEE
bank-based economies, where bank loans are the main source of financing in the corporate world. Thus
corporate governance issues in enterprises are closely related to the quality of banking assets. Good
banks should be very careful choosing clients, need to know who they are lending money to. A
corporate governance analysis of the corporate sector in CEE countries will reveal the key reasons why
state-owned banks is harmful in CEE transition countries.
4.1. Different Corporate Governance Models in Enterprises
Keasey et al (1997) incorporated in the definition of corporate governance the following: “the
structures, process, cultures and systems that engender the successful operation of the organizations”
that is line with a notion of firm as a set of contracts (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The Principal-Agent
Model is the dominant academic view of corporation. Agency relationships occur when one party, the
principal, employs another party, the agent, to perform a task on their behalf. In particular, directors
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(agents) act on behalf of shareholders (principals). The theory of interaction between an agent and the
principal for whom they act, aims to structure incentives so that the agent will act to benefit the
principal.13
The Stakeholder Model of corporate governance is a challenging approach reflecting mostly
German and Japanese environment. In contrast to Principal-Agent Model, it is based on the assumption
that the goal or objective of the corporate is wider than the maximisation of shareholder welfare alone.
CEE is more like German style corporate governance rather than American style.
4.2. Introduction of Privatisation Methods in CEE
There had been different kinds of enterprise privatisation methods, in different periods of
privatisation in CEE countries. Those privatisation methods had greatly changed the corporate
governance structure in privatised firms. Studies present various major types of privatisation methods
as following: (summarised by Peev, 2008)
(i) Employee ownership programmes and management buy-outs (insiders privatisation);
(ii) Voucher (mass) privatisation;
Eligible citizens can use vouchers that are distributed free or at nominal cost to bid for shares in
State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) or other assets. It was merely a form of artificial primary issue (IPO -
Initial Public Offering) or means of distributing ownership interests from the state to private entities
quickly and equitably. (Mejstřík, 2004, p31)
13 see http://www-personal.umich.edu/~alandear/glossary/p.html, accessed on 4th May, 2010
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(iii) Sales to local and foreign strategic investors;
Government sells it ownership stakes for profits through direct sales or asset sales of state-owned
enterprises to an individual, an existing corporation, or a group of investors.
(iv) Privatization initial public offerings (PIPOs);
Some or a government's entire stake in an SOE is sold to investors through a public share offering.
PIPOs are structured to raise money and to respond to some political pressure.
(v) Restitution (return of assets to either the original owners or their heirs).
This method is appropriate when land or other easily identifiable property that was expropriated in
years past can be returned to either the original owners or to their heirs. The major difficulty with this
method is that the records needed to prove ownership are often inadequate or conflicting.
The detailed privatisation methods for each country are provided in table 4.1.
Table 4.1. Privatisation Methods by Country
Country
Classificatio
n of
Privatisation
Year of
Privatisation Primary Method
Secondary
Method
Albania Mixed 1995 MEBO Vouchers
Armenia Mass 1994 Vouchers MEBO
Azerbaijan Mass 1997 Vouchers Direct sales
Belarus Mixed 1994 MEBO Vouchers
Bulgaria Full 1993 Direct sales Vouchers
Croatia Mixed 1992 MEBO Vouchers
Czech
Republic Mass 1992 Vouchers Direct sales
Estonia Full 1993 Direct sales Vouchers
Macedonia Mixed 1993 MEBO Direct sales
Georgia Mass 1995 Vouchers Direct sales
Hungary Full 1990 Direct sales MEBO
Kazakhstan Full 1994 Direct sales Vouchers
Kyrgyzstan Mass 1996 Vouchers MEBO
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Latvia Full 1992 Direct sales Vouchers
Lithuania Mass 1991 Vouchers Direct sales
Moldova Mass 1995 Vouchers Direct sales
Poland Full 1990 Direct sales MEBO
Romania Mixed 1992 MEBO Direct sales
Slovak
Republic Full 1995 Direct sales Vouchers
Slovenia Mixed 1998 MEBO Vouchers
Ukraine Mass 1994 Vouchers MEBO
Uzbekistan Mixed 1996 MEBO Direct sales
Note: Year of privatisation was established based on EBRD information on Primary Method of privatisation and its privatisation
chronicle. Date of privatisation is consistent with primary method of privatisation.
Source: Bennet et al, 2004.
The majority of CEE countries initiated enterprise privatisation in the early 1990s, before the
massive banking privatisation. However, many of those newly privatised firms failed to establish
standard corporate governance structures. Three situations will be illustrate in the following section.
4.3. Why State-Owned Banks are Harmful in CEE Region - Analysis Through Corporate
Governance Models
4.3.1. Scenario 1: State-Owned banks and State-Owned Enterprises
The first situation existed when state-owned enterprises were the main "clients" of state-owned
banks. State-owned enterprises have multiple incentives regarding social welfare (such as keeping
employment, etc.) and political aims, instead of pure profit-making purposes. Thus this kind of clients
often ended up in not making profits, turning the money borrowed from banks non-performing loans
(NPLs). It is in line with the theories against state-ownership in commercial banks.
From a corporate governance point of view, this could be analysed through the stakeholder model.
As the state stayed as the major stakeholder in state-owned banks, through informal channels,
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politicians and bureaucrats could successfully convince the executives of these banks to provide loans
to large companies which were also dominated by the state, arguing that this was necessary to “support
privatisation” or to “rescue” such companies by creating a buffer zone while they were adjusting to the
new market economy requirements. These loans easily turned out to be unrecoverable and the
recipients then went into either bankruptcy or pre-bankruptcy proceedings. (Mejstřík, 1999) This huge
sum of non-performing loans violated the rule of hard budget constraints and imposed greater costs for
the government and the minority shareholders of state-owned banks.
4.3.2. Scenario 2: Prudential Banking : the Anglo-Saxon Principal-Agent Model
This model, typical in Anglo-Saxon developed countries, has met great difficulties being
implemented in CEE countries. The underlying reason is the lack of suitable preconditions.
As the stock market was underdeveloped in this region in 1990s, there was little access to liquid
stock markets that would give the shareholders unrestricted, low cost exit opportunities. Particularly,
the liquidity of trading small fragments of shareholdings was negligible. Thus there was no take-over
barrier to management discretion and enormous acquisition premia. Buy-out prices, based on easily
manipulable public market price, were remarkably low. Usually, however, distribution of shareholding
into the hands of two or three legal entities was sufficient to preclude any buy-out at all. There had
been a general tendency to leave public markets and go private not only for small and medium size
firms, but also for many large companies for which this model was supposed to be appropriate. This
was evidence of mistrust and loss of interest in the relation-based corporate governance financing
model. (further developed in Mejstřík, 2003, p.375-401 )
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4.3.3. Scenario 3: Dispersed Ownership Behaves Like A Single Owner
The third situation, which had rarely been addressed regarding banking privatisation, is different
from the incentive argument presented above. It is a special and siginificant characteristic of banking
problems in Central and Eastern European countries. Those enterprises with this special form of
corporate governance structure appeared during process of transition to a market economy. Most
authors share the view that the pure act of transferring ownership of assets from state to the private
sector does not establish by itself the conditions for enhanced corporate governance.
In this situation, state-owned banks, which lack proper established credit scanning mechanism, had
a blurred vision of who they were actually lending money to. This also explains why the advanced
technology and transparent loan allocation methods brought by foreign banks are of great importance.
Standard agency theory argues that when there is a controlling shareholder (with 20% or more of
the shares), his interest in providing the public good of corporate oversight and management should
increase the firm's market value (Stiglitz, 1999). Different from the theoretical notions and assumptions
of corporate governance based on certain institutional prerequisites and practice, because of the
transition process, some CEE countries have a unique form of corporate governance, such as the
"Czech biased bivalent” form of corporate governance. (Mejstřík, 1999) In Czech Republic, controlling
interests gives the controller the right to strip assets, without any legal punishment. Thus, it was often
the case that when a single shareholder took control of a firm, market value of the firm plummeted,
43
reflecting the market’s perception that control is more associated with asset stripping than with wealth
creation. (Stiglitz, 1999)
Problems arise because of several reasons: Firstly, privatisation is an unrepeatable process and has
conflicting economic, financial and political objectives of particular interest groups (foreign vs.
domestic buyers – either insiders or outsiders) (Mejstřík, 1999), therefore, it was difficult to reconcile
the interests of each group, as well as to create a well functional corporate governance model in newly
privatised enterprises. Secondly, effective financial institutions, either in Anglo-Saxon style, or in
continental style, had been absent. Thirdly, underdeveloped institutional and legal frameworks mean
that important necessary conditions for effective corporate governance had been absent. Most contracts
were incomplete and difficult to be enforced; Non-banking financial institutions were left without
proper regulation and supervision. Those financial institutions were the collective investment vehicles,
such as mutual or investment funds, pension funds, insurance companies, the decisive domestic
“investors” born mostly by share redistribution in privatisation. Finally, there was no incentive for the
state to enforce the limited existing law to regulate enterprises and financial institutions. Due to those
reasons, a vicious circle had been set up. Owning privatised firms provided enormous benefits. Because
if the firm outperformed in value than purchase price, the owner gained the value; if the firm
underperformed, the worst situation was just bankrupt with the owner intact. The worst situation is that
owning the firm provided enormous opportunities for theft. The lack of proper legal structure provided
enormous opportunities for diverting the wealth of the firm into the hands of the “owner”, with the
owner having only limited personal liability. In many countries, the returns per unit effort to such theft,
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given the weak legal structure, clearly exceeded the returns to efforts devoted at wealth
creation.(Stiglitz, 1999)
4.3.4. How the Transitory Corporate Governance model Affects Bank Performance
The transitory corporate governance model, when large shareholder behaving as a single owner,
has a bivalent form when only “0” or “1” are the values for corporate control. As there is no mature
corporate governance structure for largely dispersed quantities of shareholdings and there is only a
single owner as a dominant block holder, even though the single owner's shares only take up
comparative majority instead of absolute majority of total equities, yet in reality the "relative majority"
shareholder feel that the entire profit ("1") of the company is at his disposal. (Mejstřík, 1999)
What makes things worse is that, the cross ownership problem existed widely in transition
countries in early years of privatisation. For example, In Czech Republic, as a result of the voucher
privatisation, about two-thirds of the privatised shares were controlled by newly founded privatisation
investment funds. The most powerful among those were the funds established and controlled by the
biggest Czech banking houses, which were in state hands. (Havel, p. 176)
Given the unrepeatable character of privatisation, in transition economies with incomplete
institutional framework and inefficient regulation, many actors in the corporate sector, not only in
industries, but also in financial sector such as investment funds and asset management companies,
played a one-off game to maximise their own profits, at the expense of the companies they managed
and other minority shareholders. Most of the time they were driven by unethical self-interests and
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forced the company they control to sign unfavarable contracts with some investment funds set up by
the dominant shareholder. Therefore, profits and assets of the company fell into the single owners' own
pockets. Besides, in a transition country without proper legal and institutional constraints at that time,
those behaviours escaped the legal punishment. Furthermore, because of underdeveloped stock market,
the remaining shareholders had been unable to sell out their shares in the capital market, or unwilling to
do so to prevent shares being concentrated further in the hands of dominant shareholders. Those
behaviours are further encouraged in absence of take-over threat. (Mejstřík, 1999)
As is common for CEE bank-based economies, the weakness in the securities market means that
bank loans are the main financing source for firms. The "cheating" practices of the single dominator
mentioned above mean that there exist huge unethical abnormal gains associated with bank loans. In
this situation, as banks under the former socialist system were not real banks and not driven by pure
commercial incentives, they simply allocated credit as directed by the government. In some cases, they
became a new source of soft-budget constraints; in other cases, they became the vehicle through which
state wealth was diverted to the hands of the related dominate owners (Stiglitz, 1999). State-owned
banks, with opaque lending channels, poor risk management, inefficient loan rating scheme, and
beaucratic corruptive culture, find it difficult to know who are their true clients. Those banks could not
assess the credit of the borrows; Furthermore, some staff at state-owned banks even had private
relations with those unethical dominate shareholders, resulting in related lending.Thus state-owned
banks, which were not guided by prudential banking rules, could not perform a monitoring role and
distinguished the sound companies from those with asset-stripping owners. (Stiglitz, 1999). Therefore,
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the loans granted by state-owned banks would easily turn into Non-Performing Loans; what is worse,
the collaterals of bank loans were usually shares of the company, which ended up worthless when the
owners gave up running the company after stripping off the assets.
4.3.5. The Rationale for Governments to Finally Give up State-ownership of Banks
In Schmidt (1996a, 1996b), the government is rational and interested in the cost and benefit of a
nationalisation or privatisation policy. Privatisation serves as a tool of the government to harden the
soft budget constraint of state-owned firms. By privatising, the government can get rid of huge
subsidising burden. Schmidt’s main conclusion is that the allocative efficiency is high but productive
efficiency is poor in nationalised situation. On the other hand, allocative efficiency is lower while
productive efficiency is higher under privatization due to a harder budget constraint.
The logic is the same for banks. Based on the theoretical arguments in the last session, the delay of
banking privatisation proved to be very costly for newly privatised enterprises, banks and the
governments.
From a investment point of view, The presence of state banks has deterred prime-rated foreign
investment from the banking market, and the potential distortions resulting from patronage or
preferential treatment of state banks have deterred these and other banks from taking on more risk.
Where banks are still used for non-commercial purposes—such as directed lending to enterprises—
these practices have more often than not led to a severe financial crisis in the banking system, high
levels of corruption, and big costs for the government. (Sherif, 2003, p 24)
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The banking industry is seen as an engine of institutional change in many countries because of
their strong interest in enforcing the law. The banks suffer greatly as a result of the weaknesses in
contractual law, problems with pledges, bankruptcy and composition procedures and delays in the
courts etc. The scheme is reasonable as part of the private banking model, but much weaker when the
state is the owner. A state bank does not like to criticise its owner, the state itself. (Havel, p. 196)
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5. Solutions to the Problem of State-Ownership in Banks
5.1. Consolidation of Non-Performing Loans(NPLs)
The Non-Performing loans in CEE transition countries were not only inherited from the
communist past but also generated as a result of initial privatisation process, where there had been
problematic corporate governance models mentioned in the last session. Those transition economies
fell into deep recession due to the collapse of thousands of state-owned enterprises and the weak
performance of newly privatised firms. In this situation, state-owned banks could not perform as an
efficient credit scanner and capital allocator; surprisingly, the newly established domestic private banks,
which did not suffer from "old" NPLs, overstaffing and high expectation of future government bailouts,
faced solvency problems after a few years of operation, due to the lack of sufficient capital and the
related lending to privatised firms. Therefore, NPL level was very high in late 1990s. It accumulated
very quickly in the balance sheets of almost all banks.
There exists close association between NPLs and state-owned banks. On the one hand, the NPLs
were associated with state-owned bank presence, on the other hand, it also hindered the banking
modernisation. CEE transition economies have taken different approaches to solve the problem of
NPLs to build viable banking systems. Methods like transferring NPLs to special institutions and
writing-off bad loans directly from bank balance sheets are only preliminary process, by which alone
cannot cure the illness of bad loans. Governments need to tackle not only the stock problem, i.e. the
inherited NPLs from the past, but also the flow problem, i.e. the need to destroy the channel that NPLs
were generated, in order to prevent new NPLs from accumulating again. (Kaufmann, Kraay and
Mastruzzi, 2005)
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Achieving the goal of keeping NPLs at a constantly low level depends on a group of factors, such
as stable business environments, functioning institutions, stable macroeconomic frameworks,
creditworthy and “equity worthy” enterprises and households. (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2005)
Not only the corporate governance of banks matters when dealing with NPLs, not also the corporate
governance in newly privatised enterprises. Without a healthy enterprise sector, NPLs will not easily
been solved even when other macro-economic conditions have been stablised.
To fundamentally prevent NPLs from accumulating again, governments should place themselves
in the appropriate position. After the preliminary clearing-off, they should focus on correcting the
incentives of banks and privatised enterprises, to cut off the related or blind lending. Besides, they
should focus on institution building, bankruptcy legislation enforcement, supervision and regulation.
Figure 5.1. : The Trend of Non-Performing Loans
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From Figure 5.1., different trends of NPL growth in 1990s and 2000s can be identified. Before
2001, even though governments transferred large amount of bad debts out of banks to consolidation
agencies, the NPL level was still high and kept bouncing back, indicating that simply transferring NPLs
is not the ultimate solution to NPL problem. However, cleaning bad debts functioned as a precondition
for foreign acquisition of domestic commercial banks, as few foreign banks would accept the
accumulated debt burdens. After 2001, seen from Figure 5.1, the NPL level is going down and staying
at a constantly low percentage of total loans. The different NPL growth patterns in the two periods
provide some hints about the final solution to bad debt problem in this region. The withdraw of direct
state-ownership in banks helped establish the appropriate incentive scheme in commercial banks;
besides, foreign bank entry consolidated the correct incentive and finally cut off related lending. The
role of foreign banks will be discussed in the next session.
5.2. The Role of Foreign Banks-A Solution to the Problem in CEE privatisation
5.2.1. Acquisitions of State-owned Banks by Foreign Banks
One interesting phenomenon during banking privatisation process in CEE countries is that, the
decrease in state ownership is accompanied by increase of foreign ownership. During the 1990s, there
existed some reluctance to sell state-owned banks to foreigners. It is more of a political issue than
economic issue. As banks are crucial channels of financial intermediation in bank-based CEE
economies, and state-owned banks were considered strategic assets of a country, governments wanted
to keep some equities of state-owned banks at least in domestic if not in state hands. However, as the
need to further substantially recapitalise problematic state-owned banks and fundamentally solve
corporate governance issues in the closely-related societies, government had no better choice other than
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inviting large foreign strategic investors in most countries.
In an increasingly integrated Europe, foreign bank participation in CEE countries also shows some
geographical preferences. Swedish banks, like Swedbank and SEB, acquired a dominant position in the
Baltic states; Austrian banks, like Raiffeisen, Erste Bank and Volksbank, and the Flemish KBC
purchased strategic assets in Central Europe; Italian banks, like Intesa and now UniCredit, as well as
some Greek and Turkish banks gained important strongholds in Southeastern Europe over time. After
20 years of transition and liberalisation, over 75% of assets across the region (in Central Europe,
Southeastern Europe, Baltic states, but not in CIS countries) are now held by foreign banks.15 All
former state or partially state-owned banks were bought by the foreign banks. Overall, this is an
unprecedented level of foreign bank penetration worldwide.
5.2.2. The Rationale for Foreign Ownership of Banks
Before the analysis of foreign ownership, it should be made clear that, in CEE transition
economies, formerly state-owned but subsequently privatised banks bought by the foreign strategic
owners should be distinguished from foreign greenfield banks when analysing bank privatisation. The
focus in the section is about why governments finally turned to strategic foreign investors to solve the
problems of state-owned banks? It can be argued based on the following reasons:
First, generally speaking, in underdeveloped financial markets, foreign banks can bring in new
capital, increase the availability of credit to the private sector in those countries. Domestic capital was
scarce in CEE countries during transition process, thus newly privatised banks usually faced
15 Focus on European Economic Integration, Special issue 2009 www.oenb.at/de/img/feei_2009_si_6_bokros_tcm14-143555.pdf. Accessed on 4th, May,
2010
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bankruptcy risks in the volatile economic situation. Foreign banks with sufficient capital and strong
support from parent banks in developed western European countries, can help establish well-
functioning financial market, expand credit and increase competition. De Haas and Lelyveld (2002)
study foreign bank ownership in five Central European economies, and conclude that there is a positive
relationship between foreign banks and private sector credit growth. Clarke et al (2003) show that
foreign banks are not restricted by domestic market conditions, and this allows them to increase their
lending much faster than the domestic banks. Lensink and Hermes (2004) show that foreign banks
increase competition in CEE banking systems, thus causing an outward shift in the supply of credit.
This shift in the supply of credit reduces the equilibrium spread between bank lending and borrowing
rates and increases equilibrium borrowing in the country.
Second, strategic foreign investors could bring financial know-how, upgrading of technology,
modern banking culture and networks into a transition country. These are especially important for
transition countries as they had no experience in running modern banking institutions in capitalist
economies. This resulted in improving the efficiency and quality of financial intermediation in general
and of credit provision in particular. Micco et al (2004) show that foreign bank entry to less developed
markets is important in improving efficiency, and Bonin et al (2005) present evidence of foreign banks
bringing know-how into the CEE countries.
Third and the most important factor when considering the advantages of foreign ownership is that
incentive problem can be solved by the the transfer of ownership from state to strategic foreign
investors. The privatised banks are supposed to be more profit efficient because of a change in
objectives. As discussed in previous sections, state-owned banks suffered from inefficiency due to
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multiple incentives apart from pure profit-seeking. Even though diffused ownership with the state
retaining the only controlling share still leaves the government in a strong position to continue running
the bank. Voucher privatisation in the Czech Republic is an illustration of this phenomenon. Besides, if
the state retains certain shares while selling a large share to a private owner, even a foreign owner,
managers of the bank may still get insider control of the bank by playing off one large owner against
the other. Abarbanell and Bonin (1997) provide a detailed description of the partial privatisation of a
Polish bank as an illustration of this situation. Thus, foreign investors acquired majority shares of
targeted state-owned banks and established correct incentive scheme in banking activities.
Next, to fully understand why selling to foreigners was the main choice and selling to domestic
owners was not a viable option for CEE countries, one should understand the special characteristics of
the local markets and societies. Related lending existed not only between state-owned banks and
borrowers but also between domestically privatised banks and creditors in a interconnected society, as
owners of privatised firms were not clearly visible and sometimes had close ties with government
officials. Foreign banks greatly solved this problem, as they are more independent of the local networks,
thus it is easier to cut off related lending. Privatised firms with opaque ownership structures failed to
get loans from properly managed banks. Thus foreign-owned banks seem to represent long-term
standard of behaviour, with new internal and external contractual architecture.
Finally, ongoing European integration is also a pulling force for foreign bank participation in CEE
countries. The accession into the EU made quick and sound privatisation a priority on the agenda of
some CEE countries. Government had to make a decision and boost economic performance in a short
span of time. Besides, most of the strategic foreign investors were trustworthy banks in Western
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European countries with great geographical proximity; most of those banks have great stakes in CEE
region and could not withdraw capital investment easily. Therefore, selling to foreigners became the
appropriate option.
From the perspective of foreign buyers, the successful purchases also depends on certain key
factors. According to Dlouhy (2004), five factors are important. The first is portfolio quality. The
government had to demonstrate clearly its pro-active attitude to solving the deteriorating asset quality
of banks. Government needs to transfer NPLs or provide guarantees or other type of security to
potential investors. The second is new capital injection by the government, instead of by the foreign
investors themselves. The third is public and political aspects of the process. For example, there might
be some concern about that the government would prefer domestic capital and domestic investors, or
only investors from certain foreign countries. The fourth is the structure of the privatisation process the
government adopts, which needs to meet two partly contradictory criteria: (a) transparency of the
process and trust of investors; (b) maximum flexibility of the negotiating position of themselves. The
final factor is timing. Banks with the greatest market share and strongest international profile should be
the first, in order to maintain a sufficient level of interests on the part of investors.
5.2.3. Experiences of Privatisation in Different Parts of Transition Economies
The three more advanced transition economies, i.e., Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland,
embarked on significantly different bank privatization programs during the first half of the 1990s. Even
before the political change, the Hungarian government had been receptive to foreign bank activity as it
allowed three foreign banks to operate in the country from 1985. By the end of 1996, three of the four
large state-owned banks in Hungary had attracted strategic foreign owners. In the Czech Republic,
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three of the largest four banks participated in the first wave of voucher privatisation in 1992 and no
Czech bank was sold to a foreign owner until 1998 (Bonin, Hasan, Wachtel, 2005b). Investment funds,
the largest of which were created by these banks, were an integral part of the Czech voucher
privatisation program. Hence, this initial divestiture of state holdings resulted in interlocking ownership
with the state retaining large controlling stakes of voucherprivatized Czech banks. Polish authorities set
a three-year timetable at the beginning of 1993 for privatising the nine medium-sized, regional, state-
owned banks that were created from the commercial portfolio of the national bank. However, by the
end of 1996, only one of these banks had a foreign owner holding a controlling stake. (Bonin, Hasan,
Wachtel, 2005b)
From figure 5.2, we can see the difference of foreign-owned banking asset share of total bank
assets in the three advanced transition economies. It was not until 2000 that Czech Republic had sold
the majority of banks to foreign investors and the share of foreing-owned bank assets is close to 90
percentage in total assets across 2000s. Hungary sold the majority of state-owned banks at a very early
stage in mid-1990s.
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Figure5.2 Assets of State-owned Banks (asob) and Assets of Foreign Owned Banks (afob) in
Percent of Total Assets in Three Advanced Transition Countries
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From the figure above, we can see that Poland privatised the majority state-owned banks firstly by
selling to domestic owners before 1999, followed by selling large shares to foreign investors. However,
in 2000s, Poland still kept around 20 percentage of total bank assets in state's hands.
Figure 5.3: the Growing Trend of Foreign Bank Asset Share in Sample Countries
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From Figure 5.3 above, we can see the growth trend of foreign-owned bank asset share in percent
of total assets for individual country. For most of the CIS countries, the foreign-owned bank asset share
in percent of total assets has been growing not as rapidly as the advanced Central European countries.
For SEE countries, i.e., Bulgaria, Croatia, and Romania, because of macroeconomic instability and
financial distress, banking privatisation was not feasible before 1995. After instituting a currency board
and stabilising the macroeconomic environment, the Bulgarian government privatised its first bank to a
consortium of investors in 1997. By the end of 2000, eight of the ten largest banks in Bulgaria were
foreign owned. In Croatia, only one small foreign bank was operating in 1995 and foreign ownership of
banking assets was less than 0.5%. However, in later 1990s there was a huge wave of bank
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privatisation in these countries. By 2002, in five of the six countries, at least 75% of the total banking
assets have become under foreign control. Romania was the laggard in bank privatisation in our sample;
the three largest banks were state owned until 1999. (Bonin, Hasan and Wachtel, 2005b)
There have been lots of papers investigating the benefits and losses of foreign bank participation.
Bonin used cost and profit efficiency measures and suggests that, although banks sold to foreign
owners are not more cost-efficient immediately after privatisation, they do manage revenues more
efficiently. (Bonin, Hasan and Wachtel, 1999) Foreign-owned banks pursue more fee-for-service
business and do so more successfully after privatisation. Empirical results suggest that privatised banks
with strategic foreign owners redirect their attention to profitable business.
5.3. The Changing Role of Government in Banking Industry - From Direct
Ownership to Supervision and Regulation
As discussed at the beginning of this paper, there are two different roles of government in banking
sector— direct ownership and supervision. However, these two roles sometimes conflict with each
other. State-owned banks may be less subject to monitoring by depositors, because in a financial crisis
they are more likely to be bailed out by the government, which gives depositors less incentive to pay
attention to the operation and management quality of banks. Besides, government, as owner of banks,
could appoint personnel and manipulate credit rationing, can hardly be subject to the effective
supervision of itself.
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Therefore, the strong and independent regulation and supervision function of a government is
crucial for the healthy development of banking sector in transition countries. The transformed role of
government from owners to regulators is an extremely important determinant in the success of not only
banking privatisation but also banking development afterwards.
Privatisation of state-owned bank resulted in a fundamental change of the financial services
landscape in CEE countries. Nowadays, as most of the banking sectors in CEE are already firmly in the
hands of international banking groups, banks started to offer western-style quality services to different
industries and integrate this region into mainstream world financial market. Corporate as well as retail
customers were able to finance themselves through creditable bank loans on a competitive and pure
business basis, and put savings into safe and sound institutions. The central planning economy had
been transformed into a consumer-based business environment. However, the integration also caused
problems, such as unprecedented credit boom, substantial overheating of these economies and financial
crisis contagion. Despite all problems, even today, it is clear that foreign banks are still the most solid
backbones of the CEE economies.
There are still a few state banks existing in CEE economies, According to the latest CEE sector
banking report in 2009, Poland's largest bank, PKO still remains majority state-owned, and Poland is
not expected to give up its majority stake in the foreseeable future. Majority state-owned banks also
still hold a relatively large market share in Slovenia.17 The privatisation process is almost complete in
SEE. In Serbia, large scale banking privatisation was completed with the final sale of Vojvodanska
17 CEE banking sector report 2009, Raiffeisen Research RZB Group
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banka to the National Bank of Greece in November 2006. In Bulgaria, the privatisation process was
already finalised in 2003. BCR, the largest Romanian bank, was sold to Erste Bank in late 2005.18
Over the past few years, the focus has been shifting from fundamental to more advanced reforms
in the banking sector. The implementation of international accounting standards and Basel II require
the government to enforce more efficient regulation and supervision of the banking industry. Stability
and growth of the financial sector in lots of CEE transition countries were achieved not only by
recapitalisation and privatisation, but also from great improvement in regulation and supervision to
ensure the rule of prudential banking. Successful privatisation needs standard regulatory and
supervisory framework, which is independent from political interference and powerful business group's
interests.
Furthermore, European integration also strengthened the domestic arrangements of banking
regulation and supervision in CEE countries. To meet the fundamental requirements of EU accession,
several CEE countries have adopted the western-style banking regulation structure. Besides, as most
banks are owned by western European countries, there are triple layers of regulations in those banks -
Local central bank, parent bank, and central bank in the parent country. The contrast between CEE and
CIS countries is obvious in this sense. In CIS countries, regulatory and supervisory institutions are still
lacking, thus banks are still largely manipulated by strong political and business power and fail to
practice prudential rules.
18 CEE banking sector report 2009, Raiffeisen Research RZB Group
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6. Empirical Tests
The empirical tests, composed of both micro-level and macro-level specifications, are conducted to
evaluate the banking sector efficiency, and estimate the influence of ownership on banking
performance.
6.1. Measurement of Bank Production Efficiency
On the micro-level, we use Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) to measure the production
efficiency of selected banks in CEE countries.
The Stochastic Frontier production function was first proposed by Aigner, Lovell and
Schmidt(1977), Meeusen and Van den Broek (1977), Battese and Corra (1977) independently. The
original specification can be expressed in log form as
ln(Yi) = βln(xi)+Vi−Ui i=1,2,...,N. (1)
Where Yi is the production of the i-th firm;
xi is an input vector for firm j;
β is an vector of unknown parameters.
Vi accounts for random effects affecting the value of the output variable, they are variables assumed to
be iid;
Ui, which are non-negative random variables, are assumed to account for technical inefficiency in
production and often assumed to be iid.
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The model is stochastic because the upper limit is determined by the stochastic variable exp(xi +
Vi). The random error,vj ,can be positive or negative and so the stochastic frontier outputs vary relative
to the deterministic part of the frontier model, exp(xj) (Coelli et al., 1997, p. 45).
The production function we are going to use to estimate bank efficiency is the Cobb-Douglas
production frontier assuming a half-normal distribution. (Coelli, 1996)
ln(Qi)=β0 + β1ln(Ki) +β2ln(Li) + Vi−Ui i=1,2,...,N. (2)
Where Qi,Ki, Li are output, capital and labour, respectively, and Vi and Ui are assumed normal and half-
normal distributed, respectively.
As there are various services and products of commercial banks, there have been no consistent
implementations choosing specific variables for bank output and input. Inspired by Bonin,
Hasan&Wachtel (2005), we use the criterion of value adding to determine which bank products or
services to include as outputs. Banking activities that produce a flow of banking services associated
with a substantial labour or physical capital expenditure are identified as outputs. After synthesizing the
variables used by Hansan&Marton (2003), Bonin, Hasan&Wachtel (2005), and Fries &Taci (2005), we
define Output Qi as the aggregate of total loans, total investments (other earning assets), non-interest or
fee-related income, and total interest bearing borrowed funds (total deposit).
Ideally, the production function require two input prices, one for labour and the other for physical
capital input, which are denoted as "personnel expenses divided by the number of full-time equivalent
workers" and "the ratio of non-interest expenses to total fixed assets", respectively. However, the bank-
level data for personnel expenses and number of employees is much less available than other variables
needed for the function. This caused a loss of more than 1000 observations, resulting in the failure of
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the regression. We also tried to calculate the ratio of personnel expense to total assets as a proxy for the
price of labour, but this also resulted in the loss of about 900 observations because of missing values.
Therefore, we followed Bonin, Hasan and Wachtel (2005) and Hasan and Marton (2003) to include the
price of fund, measured by "the ratio of total interest expenses to total interest bearing borrowed funds
(total deposits)", into our function. So our refined Cobb-Douglas production frontier function is the
following:
ln(Qi)=β0 + β1ln(Ki) +β2ln(Fi) + Vi−Ui i=1,2,...,N. (3)
Where Output (Qi) = loans + other earning assets + non-interest income + deposit;
Inputs includes:
Capital price (Ki) = ratio of non-interest expenses to total fixed assets;
Fund price (Fi)= total interest expense divided by total deposits.
Data
The micro-level data for individual bank used for SFA is from Bankscope(Bureau Van Dijk, DVD
March 2010 version). BANKSCOPE is a comprehensive, global database containing financial and
other information about over 11,000 public and private banks. (See Bureau Van Dijk's Bankscope
Brochure). Considering availability and accountability of financial data, we selected consolidated
yearly financial report (global format) data for banks in 11 relatively advanced CEE countries, from
year 1995 to 2007. However, the data for transition countries require careful reviewing to construct a
reliable sample. We used banks with consolidated financial reports to avoid the duplication of
institutions, chose the global presentation of financial report to get the consistent data across different
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countries, and made sure that only commercial banks are included in the sample, excluding non-bank
financial institutions of various kinds. After the screening process, there are 296 banks in the sample,
including 26 banks in Bulgaria, 38 in Croatia, 30 in Czech Republic, 11 in Estonia, 35 in Hungary, 24
in Latvia, 10 in Lithuania, 55 in Poland, 25 in Romania, 19 in Slovakia and 23 in Slovenia.
Table 6.1 Descriptive Statistics of Variables for Calculating Banking Production Efficiency
Bank Variables Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Interest Expense 2053 14183.55 54168.54 -0.061 802258.7
Operating Expense 2056 18370.12 78720.29 -1205.8 1303285
Total Customer Loans 2052 275707.4 1309613 0 3.06E+07
Total Other Earning Assets 2061 195997 958956.8 0 1.81E+07
Total Operating Income 2056 26611.52 122678.8 -48.9 2238070
Other Operating Income 1990 3418.68 18805.07 -102053.4 282464.1
Total Deposits 2056 383592 1819542 0 4.19E+07
Personnel Expenses 1766 7975.853 35536.5 0 573922
Other Operating Expenses 2056 9617.852 40244.32 -3141 592484.6
Number of Employees 1263 1628.658 4414.632 2 78291
Total Fixed Assets 2049 10230.45 46593.24 -0.4 829979.5
Constructed variables Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Output (Q) 1937 927525.5 4246661 0.066 9.31E+07
Capital Price (K) 1937 2.752068 16.37835 0.0589825 652.4
Labour Price (L) 1157 7.521137 19.67712 0 342.148
Cost of Fund (F) 1937 0.068683 0.3309144 0.0010557 14
ln(Q) 1937 8.246316 4.177158 -2.718101 18.34895
ln(K) 1937 0.1371768 1.055594 -2.830514 6.480658
ln(F) 1937 -3.135959 0.7802818 -6.853542 2.639057
Source: author's own calculation based on Bankscope data.
We use the software Frontier 4.1 —which is specific for SFA— to calculate the production
efficiency score.This program follows a three-step procedure to estimate the maximum likelihood
estimates of the parameters of a stochastic frontier production function. Firstly, Ordinary Least
Squares(OLS) estimates of the function are obtained. Secondly, a two-phase grid search of γ is
conducted, with the β parameters set to the OLS values and β0 and σ2 parameters adjusted according to
the corrected OLS formula presented in Coelli (1995). The last step is that the values selected in the
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grid search are used as starting values in an iterative procedure to produce the maximum likelihood
estimates. (Coelli, 1996)
After obtaining the Production Efficiency estimates for each bank in the sample, the average scores
for individual country in each year are calculated and presented in the Appendix Table A1. The average
scores are exhibited also in Figure 6.1 Below.
Figure 6.1: Banking Production Efficiency Score
Source: Author's own compilation
From Figure 6.1, a clear and sharp increasing trend from 1996 to 2001 can be identified. After 2001,
banking efficiency level stayed at a constantly high level. It is consistent with the expectation. During
the early years of banking privatisation in late 1990s, banking efficiency experienced great
improvement, starting from a very low efficiency level. Very few papers have dealt with the most
recent years in 2000s. The graph shows that after 2001, when most of privatisation process has been
through, the banking production efficiency level becomes very high and the trend stays very stable. The
possible reason is that, as lots of state-owned banks were sold to foreign strategic owners, besides large
number of foreign bank entry (green-field), the banking sector in this region finally started to catch up
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with international standard banking efficiency level. Another interesting phenomenon is that the
efficiency estimates of each country after year 2001 are highly homogeneous. This might indicate the
similar high efficiency level achieved in the selected banks in those 11 advanced transition countries.
It should not be ignored that, there might be some flaws regarding our sample and methodology
in the process of calculating production efficiency estimates. Because there had been lots of
Mergers&Acquisitions and restructuring during banking privatisation period, the consistency of bank's
financial data across yeas is relatively weak compared to banks in developed economies. To avoid
duplication of information, the financial data of the banks we selected are based on consolidated
financial reports.
6.2. An Overview, Sources and Description of Other Aggregated Variables
Besides the obtained banking production efficiency scores presented above, based on the literature
review and data availability, we managed to collect country-level data regarding aggregate banking
performance indicators, banking ownership, reform index and other macro-economic variables. Table
6.2 provides a basic descriptions about those data, and more detailed description and analysis of the
data is provided in the Appendix.
Table 6.2. Aggregated Country-level Data Descriptions and Sources
Variable Code Measurement Source
Net interest margin netintmargin
Accounting value of a bank's net
interest revenue as a share of its
total assets
New Database on
Financial Development
and Structure
(Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt
and Levine, 2000)
Overhead cost overhead
Accounting value of a bank's
overhead costs as share of its total
assets
(Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt
and Levine, 2000)
ROA roa Bank return on Assets (Beck, Demirgüç-Kuntand Levine, 2001)
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ROE roe Bank return on Equity (Beck, Demirgüç-Kuntand Levine, 2002)
Bank Concentration
ratio concentration
It is defined as the ratio of the three
largest banks' assets to total
banking sector assets.
(Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt
and Levine, 2003)
Deposit Money Bank
Assets / GDP dbagdp
Measurement of Banking sector
size
(Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt
and Levine, 2004)
Private Credit by
Deposit Money Banks
to GDP
pcrdbgdp
Credit issued to the private sector
as opposed to governments and
public enterprises.
(Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt
and Levine, 2005)
Bank Credit / Bank
Deposits bcbd
Accounting value of bank credit to
deposit
(Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt
and Levine, 2006)
Asset share of state-
owned banks (in per
cent)
asob
The share of majority state-owned
bank(state ownership exceeding 50
per cent) assets in total bank sector
assets.
Source: EBRD Statisitics;
Asset share of foreign-
owned banks (in per
cent)
afob
The share of total bank sector
assets in banks with foreign
ownership exceeding 50 per cent,
end-of-year.
Source: EBRD Statisitics;
Non-performing loans
(in percent of total
loans)
npl The ratio of non-performing loansto total loans Source: EBRD Statisitics;
Large-scale
privatisation lspri Privatisation index Source: EBRD Statisitics;
Governance and
enterprise restructuring res Privatisation index Source: EBRD Statisitics;
Banking reform and
interest rate
liberalisation
breform Privatisation index Source: EBRD Statisitics;
Domestic credit to
private sector(in per
cent of GDP)
dcrepr
Ratio of total bank credit to private
sector at end-of-year, including
households and enterprises, to
GDP.
Source: EBRD Statisitics;
Domestic credit to
households (in per cent
of GDP)
dcreh
Ratio of total outstanding
bank credit to households, at end-
of-year, to GDP.
Source: EBRD Statisitics;
GDP growth gdpg Annual GDP growth rate EBRD transition report
Inflation inf Annual Inflation rate EBRD transition report
Source: Author's own compilation
6.3. Some Flaws about Available Data
The problem regarding bankscope database also applies here. Although on average around 90% of
the banking sector assets in a given country and year are covered in Bankscope, the possibility of
sampling error and bias should not be underestimated. (also noted by Beck,T. Demirgüç-Kunt,A. and
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Levine,R., 2000). Variables like "net interest margin" and "overhead costs" are calculated as averages
of all banks in a country in a given year. This may not truly represent the efficiency level in a given
country. Moreover, the two efficiency measures are based on unconsolidated balance sheets, while the
concentration index is based on data in both unconsolidated and consolidated balance sheets. As we
compile our dataset from various sources, the data consistency is not very strong.
6.4. Data Analysis for Regression Purposes
It was originally scheduled to include CE, SEE, Baltic States and CIS countries in our panel dataset,
however, as the key dependent variable "Banking Production Efficiency Score (effscore)" has been
calculated only for 11 advanced transition countries in CE, SEE and Baltics, based on the
accountability and availability of financial data in Bankscope. Besides, for another key dependent
variable "NPLs", CIS data is excluded because the NPL data for CIS countries has been greatly
understated and thus unreliable, let alone the large amount of missing data. Therefore, the constructed
panel dataset includes 11 transition countries in Central Europe (CE), Southeastern Europe (SEE), and
Baltics, from year 1995 to 2007. The panel dataset is strongly balanced.
6.4.1 An Overview of Key Variables
The main aim of the empirical analysis is to test the relationship between bank efficiency and
ownership (State-ownership and Foreign-ownership) in CEE countries. Other banking performance
indicators such as profitability measures (ROE, ROA) and credit supply measure are also tested.
From the graphs of ROE and ROA, presented in Figure 6.2 and 6.3 below, the patterns of
ROE/ROA before 2000 and after 2000 is drastically different. The country difference is more obvious
in early years, with more volatile ROE/ROA. After 2000, it tends to converge to a moderate positive
level and keeps a stable flat growth pattern.
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Figure 6.2: Bank ROE Figure6.3: Bank ROA
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The main dependent variable - Banking Production Efficiency (effscore) has been discussed in detail in the
previous section. Another variable measuring "domestic credit to private sector" (dcrepr) is presented in Figure
6.5. During the late 1990s, credit to private sector stayed at a low level, with only the exception of a few
countries like Czech Republic. After the majority of banks were sold to foreign investors, there was only
moderate growth of credit supply, and even some negative growth in some countries, signifying the standard rule
of prudential banking. Only in late 2000s, credit supply started to grow rapidly.
Figure6.4 : Banking Production Efficiency Figure 6.5: Domestic Credit to Private Sector (% of GDP)
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Ownership variables, "Asset share of State-Owned Banks in percent of total assets (asob)" and
"Asset share of Foreign-Owned Banks in percent of total assets (afob)" have opposite trends as
presented by Figure 6.6 and Figure 6.7. The decrease of state-owned bank assets is accompanied by the
increase of foreign-owned bank asset share. This is consistent with descriptions and analysis in earlier
part of the paper.
Figure 6.6: Asset Share of State-Ownd Banks in Percent of Total Assets (asob)
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Source: author's own compilation based on EBRD data.19
19 See website: http://www.ebrd.com/country/sector/econo/stats/index.htm, detailed data sources will be presented in the
appendix
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Figure 6.7: Asset Share of Foreign-owned Banks in Percent of Total Assets (afob)
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Table 6.3 :Descriptive Statistics of Variables
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max Unit
dbagdp 143 0.4081848 0.1918437 0.109554 0.8428232 Ratio
pcrdbgdp 141 0.314784 0.1674577 0.0633196 0.8278704 Ratio
pcrdbofgdp 141 0.314784 0.1674577 0.0633196 0.8278704 Ratio
bdgdp 143 0.3548006 0.1488505 0.1030815 0.6718888 Ratio
bcbd 142 0.9302016 0.3664305 0.3615819 2.390115 Ratio
overhead 142 0.0484878 0.0224497 0.0164302 0.1188328 Ratio
concentration 143 0.6711096 0.1500978 0.3803535 1 Ratio
netintmargin 141 0.0461346 0.0215635 0.019513 0.1534247 Ratio
roa 142 0.0074363 0.0164635 -0.0685714 0.0786778 Ratio
roe 142 0.1076013 0.1716516 -0.71126 1.060129 Ratio
asob 142 22.37254 23.83024 0 84.3 %
afob 137 58.07956 31.29857 0 99.4 %
npl 141 11.56383 12.02736 0.2 58.5 %
dcrepr 126 35.7127 19.01751 7.2 93.9 %
dcreh 118 11.34915 9.819732 0.7 43.3 %
res 143 2.907622 0.4460783 2 3.67 Index
lspri 143 3.275105 0.8641628 1 4 Index
breform 143 3.313986 0.4641517 2 4 Index
gdpg 132 5.174242 3.135676 -6.1 12.4 %
inf 132 18.18485 95.1321 -1.1 1082 %
efficiencyscore 138 0.7386618 0.3630379 8.15e-07 0.9828764 0-1
Source: author's own compilation in stata
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Table 6.3 above reports the descriptive statistics of the variables being experimented in the
regression analysis. Table 6.4 below presents the correlation matrix for all the variables. Non-
Performing Loans (npl) and Asset Share of State-Owned Banks (asob) are highly positively correlated
(coefficient = 0.7194 > 0.50); Among the possible influencing factors of efficiency, Efficiency Score
(effscore) and Asset Share of State-Owned Banks (asob) are negatively correlated (coefficient= -0.499
≈ 0.5)；Efficiency Score (effscore) and Asset Share of Foreign-Owned Banks (afob) are highly
positively correlated (coefficient= 0.5137 > 0.5); Banking reform (breform) is positively correlated to
Efficiency Score (effscore), and inflation (inf) is highly negatively correlated with effscore. The two
ownership indicators— asob and afob — are strongly negatively correlated. Regarding the
privatisation index, banking reform (breform) and large scale privatisation (lspri) are both highly
positively correlated with res, but correlation between lspri and breform is low.
Table 6.4 Correlation Matrix for the Variables
dbagdp pcrdbgdp bcbd bdgdp overhead concentration netintmargin
dbagdp 1
pcrdbgdp 0.9466 1
bcbd 0.2456 0.4603 1
bdgdp 0.8319 0.7083 -0.1858 1
overhead -0.3868 -0.3714 -0.1547 -0.424 1
concentration -0.1677 -0.0744 0.3072 -0.2042 0.0928 1
netintmargin -0.257 -0.1987 0.0247 -0.3911 0.6409 -0.0721 1
roa 0.1312 0.1191 0.2088 0.0423 -0.4184 -0.0907 0.0067
roe 0.2116 0.2151 0.172 0.1497 -0.3433 -0.061 -0.088
asob -0.0868 -0.0875 -0.2227 -0.1201 0.369 -0.06 0.2
afob -0.0207 0.0349 0.0806 0.1227 -0.2008 0.2801 -0.1184
npl 0.1129 0.0897 -0.315 0.2008 0.2448 -0.1375 0.0302
dcrepr 0.8561 0.9261 0.5323 0.5542 -0.4617 -0.1328 -0.2243
dcreh 0.6558 0.7301 0.5518 0.3917 -0.3994 -0.0532 -0.0797
res 0.3859 0.3528 0.1957 0.3746 -0.3501 0.2696 -0.2965
lspri 0.4194 0.3878 0.2304 0.3346 -0.1703 0.1696 -0.2105
breform 0.3734 0.4037 0.3179 0.3678 -0.4169 0.0223 -0.2282
gdpg 0.2384 0.2576 0.1025 0.1121 -0.2951 -0.4423 -0.0639
inf -0.1532 -0.0958 0.0283 -0.2112 0.4328 -0.0283 0.3964
effscore 0.1935 0.1561 -0.0356 0.2618 -0.3889 -0.0611 -0.2516
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roa roe asob afob npl dcrepr dcreh
roa 1
roe 0.6071 1
asob -0.4696 -0.1809 1
afob 0.2104 0.0726 -0.6972 1
npl -0.464 -0.188 0.7194 -0.3872 1
dcrepr 0.2594 0.2581 -0.2123 0.0553 -0.1164 1
dcreh 0.4437 0.2494 -0.417 0.3164 -0.3562 0.8549 1
res 0.2091 0.2796 -0.3303 0.3267 -0.1265 0.2937 0.254
lspri -0.0704 0.0393 -0.1353 0.1148 0.0842 0.3218 0.2444
breform 0.3907 0.2889 -0.682 0.5945 -0.5123 0.4534 0.5668
gdpg 0.3103 0.1805 -0.1074 0.0181 -0.2033 0.4177 0.4774
Inf -0.1593 0.1364 0.3426 -0.4036 0.1571 -0.1374 -0.2163
effscore 0.3841 0.1523 -0.499 0.5137 -0.3409 0.2146 0.3306
Source: Stata calculated results from the compiled data.
6.5. The Empirical Results
6.5.1. The Model Specifications and Methodology
Model specification:
We will experiment with the following models suitable for panel data.
(1). Pooled model:
ititit uXY ++= 01 ββ
i= 1,...,n
t= 1,..,T
(2). Fixed Effects model with Country Effects:
itiitit uXY ++= αβ 1
(3). Fixed Effects model with Country and Time effects:
ittiitit uSXY ++++= )( 301 ββαβ
res lspri breform gdpg inf effscore
res 1
lspri 0.5192 1
breform 0.632 0.2871 1
gdpg -0.1213 -0.1397 0.1323 1
Inf -0.2008 -0.1675 -0.2557 -0.1316 1
effscore 0.1727 -0.0049 0.4346 0.1114 -0.576 1
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(4). Fixed Effects Model with Country and Time Effects and other explanatory variables:
∑
=
+++++=
m
k
ititittiitit u(k)ZSXY
1
301 )( γββαβ
One of the most important strengths of the panel data approach is the combination of both the time
dimension and the cross-section dimension. This combination leads to more observations, increasing
the degrees of freedom and hopefully reducing the collinearity among explanatory variables – hence
improving the efficiency of econometric estimates (Hsiao 2003, p.3). Furthermore, the panel data
approach enables to control for omitted variables that are persistent over time. “By utilizing
information on both the inter-temporal dynamics and the individuality of the entities being investigated,
one is able to control in a more natural way for the effects of missing or unobserved variables” (Hsiao
2003, p. 5).
6.5.2 Regression Analysis For Banking Production Efficiency:
Dependent variable: Banking Productivity Efficiency Score (effscore)
Key Independent variables: Asset Share of State-Owned Banks in Percent of Total Assets (asob)
Figure 6.8 :Fixed Effects - Country effect
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Figure 6.8 shows the trend of efficiency score across the years, controlling for country effects. It
is consistent with previous figures about efficiency score. During late 1990s, the production efficiency
is quite low and country differences are obvious. During 2000s, efficiency has been greatly improved
with the convergence of country differences.
Figure 6.9 : Fitted Line of Efficiency Score (effscore) and State Ownership (asob)
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Following Stock and Watson, as a rule-of-thumb, we should always assume heteroskedasticiy in
your model (see Stock and Watson, 2007, chapter 4). Results about heteroskedasticity will be checked
in later part. Thus, this paper uses heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent (clustered)
standard errors in case that uit could be correlated over time. Table 6.4 shows the regression results of
various model speculations. In table 6.4, each column reports a different regression and each row
reports a coefficient estimate and standard error, and p-value.
The core task here is to test the overall impacts of ownership on banking production efficiency in
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CEE, as stated in the Hypothesis 2.The first two columns (1.1 - 1.2) report the results of the pooled
model. Columns 1.3 - 1.7 report the results of country fixed effects model; the rest columns (1.8-1.9)
present the results of both country and time fixed effects model.
A relevant issue to be concerned about in a multivariate regression analysis is the collinearity of
regressors with each other. From the correlation matrix presented in the last part, some of the important
regressors are highly correlated, such as between the two kinds of ownership and between the three
privatisation indicators. In order to eliminate multicollinearity problem, this paper places highly and
significantly correlated variables in separate regression specifications.
In table 6.5 below, for the pooled OLS regressions presented in 1.1 and 1.2 equations, it is shown
that the coefficients of asob is -0.009068 and -0.0055233, respectively, which is negative and
statistically significant at 1% significance level; while the other possible influencing factors of
efficiency included in column 1.2 are not significant, with the exception of breform, which has a
positive coefficient statistically significant at 5% significance level. The adjusted R2 for both of the two
pooled OLS regressions are not very high, which indicate the weak explaining power of the equations.
Nevertheless, focusing on the main regressor asob, the pooled model provides preliminary evidence
supporting Hypothesis 2 that the impacts of state ownership on banking production efficiency is
negative. This is also consistent with the theoretical prediction.
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Table 6.5: Regression Analysis of effects on Banking Production Efficiency
Dependent Variable: Banking Production Efficiency (effscore)
Regressor 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9
asob -.009068***
(0.000962)
-.0055233***
(.001939)
-.0124483***
(.001165)
-.0076868***
(.0019745)
-.006788***
(.001897)
-.0065463***
(.0018822)
.0005156*
(.0002876)
.0008292**
( .0004004)
afob .0034995***
(.0012117)
breform .2727082**
(.1245217)
.3273119***
(.0979532)
.3263105***
(.1137196)
.3056239***
(.0988159)
.3299998***
(.0940086)
-.0052348
( .0200399)
lspri .2773619**
(.1214031)
.2740071**
(.1216096)
.1807574*
(.1066472)
.0365003**
(.0162981)
res -.138348
(.0847606)
-.0747167
(.1646163)
gdpg -.001911
(.0072947)
-.0041363
(.0085702)
-.0106885
(.0084549)
-.0166466*
(.0090888)
-.0173498**
(.0085276)
-.0265866***
(.0068939)
concentratio
n
.7617054**
(.2979325)
.5978884*
(.3142709)
.5503724*
(.3207753)
.5202459*
(.3054723)
.6755429**
(.2597776)
-.1039312**
(.0525078)
inf -.0003309*
(.0001948)
-.0003343*
(.0001864)
-.0003327*
(.0001846)
-.0077145***
(.0019826)
Constant 0.943481***
( 0.029141)
.3959751
(.3348085)
.5474507
(.2122402)
-.4979546
(.4385059)
-1.146509**
(.5304349)
-1.267331***
(.4839068)
-1.373778***
(.3731921)
.0428502
(.0349394)
.0003675
.0801699
Country
effects?
no no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time
effects?
no no no no no no no yes yes
Adjusted R2 0.3470 0.3531 0.4208 0.4840 0.5062 0.5094 0.6041 0.9864 0.9871
No. Of Obs 137 130 130 130 130 130 127 137 137
Source: Stata calculated results from the compiled data.
Notes: Standard errors in the parentheses.
* Statistically significant at 10% level;
** Statistically significant at 5% level;
*** Statistically significant at 1% level.
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From columns 1.3 to 1.7, we can see that all the R2 for country fixed effects OLS regressions are
higher than the adjusted R2 in pooled model. which suggests that the national characteristics of the
individual countries in our sample are of significance in banking production efficiency improvement
additional to the trend of ceding state-ownership in banks. It is easy to identify that, across 1.3 to 1.6,
all coefficients of asob are negative and statistically significant at 1% significance level. Besides the
key regressor asob, other fundamental variables as indicated by literature review, are added in
gradually, resulting in an increasing adjusted R2 from 1.3 to 1.5. Then in 1.6 equation, in order to
eliminate the the problem of collinearity between res and breform/lspri, we excluded res and achieved
an eve higher adjusted R2. In equation 1.7, in order to eliminate the the problem of collinearity between
state ownership (asob) and foreign ownership (afob), we excluded asob and used afob instead. The
coefficient for Banking Reform Index (breform) is positive and significant at 1% level in all equations
from 1.4 to 1.7. This signifies the positive influence of banking sector reform on efficiency
improvement. The coefficient of large scale privatisation (lspri) is also positive and significant at 5% in
1.5 and 1.6 and at 10% in 1.7, which indicates the large scale privatisation had helped improve banking
production efficiency. The macroeconomic variable inflation (inf) has negative coefficients significant
at 10 % level and at 1% level only in equation 1.7, indicating the negative effects of inflation on
banking production efficiency.
All the results above are consistent with what theory and previous empirical studies implicates;
however, the sign of GDP growth (gpdg) and Bank concentration (concentration) are against our
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expectations. The GDP growth has a negative sign while the concentration has a positive sign. The
problem with GDP growth is probably because of the years included in our sample. GDP in CEE
countries grew the fastest in the late 1990s and early 2000s, when the massive privatisation methods
started to yield pleasant results; while in mid and late 2000s, the growth rate stayed at a moderate level.
But the efficiency score is generally low in 1990s and very high in 2000s. This might have caused the
statistic result which is not consistent to our expectation. For the concentration variable, the problem is
that, it does not vary a lot across years and countries, especially years. It is because after foreign banks
acquired the domestic banks in CEE, the market structure did not change drastically as most banks still
kept their independence under the governance of foreign owners, instead of merging into
conglomerates.
The equation 1.6 is the best attempt so far, with all variables significant and a R2 of 0.5094. For
understanding the magnitude of state-ownership (asob), it should be noted that the asob is a number
between 0-100 (unit: %) while Efficiency Score (effscore) is a number between 0-1.
The equation 1.7 is also good specification for testing the impact of foreign ownership on banking
production efficiency. As the sign of foreign ownership (afob) has positive sign and is significant at 1%
level, which indicates the positive influence of foreign ownership in the total bank assets on overall
banking production efficiency.
The columns 1.8 and 1.9 present the results of both country and time fixed effects OLS
regressions. The R2 is much higher than pervious specifications; The coefficients for asob are also
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negative, but they are only significant at a higher level at 10% and 5%, respectively, let alone the
magnitudes are much smaller.
To sum up, comparing the impacts of state-ownership (asob) on the banking production efficiency
scores (effscore) in the advanced 11 CEE transition countries, which have been estimated with the
pooled OLS and fixed country and time effects OLS methods, we can see that the fixed effects OLS
regression results are stronger than those from the pooled OLS. Summarizing the all the regression
equations, judged from both the pooled OLS and fixed effects OLS estimations, we find that the impact
of state-ownership (asob) on the banking production efficiency scores (effscore) in the advanced 11
CEE transition countries has been negative. This provides strong support for the acceptance of the
Hypothesis 2. In addition, it also provides evidence for the positive impact of foreign-ownership on
banking production efficiency improvement, which is stated in Hypothesis 3.
6.5.3. Regression Analysis for Non-Performing Loans
Due to the importance of Non-Performing Loans as an indicator of prudential banking and
efficiency, another set of regressions are experimented to understand the affecting factors of NPLs. The
dependent variable is Non-Performing Loans (npl), and the key independent variable is Asset share of
state-owned banks (in per cent) (asob). The same methodology as in Regression Analysis One is used.
The results are presented in Table 6.6 below.
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Table 6.6: Regression Analysis of effects on Non-Performing Loans
Dependent Variable: Non-Performing Loans(npl)
Regressor 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7
asob 0.2677***
(0.0551)
0.2883***
(0.0571)
0.2196***
(0.0635)
0.2138***
(0.0615)
0.0999*
(0.0584)
afob -0.1037**
(0.0488)
-0.0199
(0.0417)
gdpg -1.1725***
(0.4242)
-
1.2403***
(0.4532)
-1.2378***
(0.4407)
-0.8592**
(0.3563)
-1.2723**
(0.5487)
-1.0898***
(0.3656)
dcrepr 0.2093**
(0.0834)
0.2461***
(0.0740)
0.3989***
(0.0737)
0.5093***
(0.0619)
res 11.48316**
(5.4032)
12.1732**
(5.1300)
lspri -19.5745***
(4.6318)
-19.572***
( 4.6518)
Constant 7.2080*
(3.7693)
10.6865***
(3.3081)
-2.6911
(5.4565)
-41.8746**
(17.4627)
12.4358
(18.6015)
21.3151***
(6.7849)
14.827
( 19.25115)
Country
effects?
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time
effects?
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Adjusted
R2
0.5917 0.6171 0.6241 0.6371 0.6993 0.5380 0.7038
No. Of
Obs
140 131 119 119 119 131 116
Source: Stata calculated results from the compiled data.
Notes: Standard errors in the parentheses.
* Statistically significant at 10% level;
** Statistically significant at 5% level;
*** Statistically significant at 1% level.
Only panel data fixed effects OLS regression results are presented in Table 6.6, as pooled
regression did not produce any strong results. Columns 2.1 to 2.5 present equations with state-
ownership as the main regressor. For the first four equations, the coefficients of state ownership (asob)
is positive and highly significant at 1% level. With more regressors added in, the adjusted R2 increases
gradually from 0.5917 to 0.6371 and all newly added variables have significant coefficients. In
Equation 2.5, with more explaining variables added in, the the coefficient of state ownership (asob)
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became significant only at 10% level. The most important result is that, there are positive and highly
significant signs for asob in all the five specifications. This strongly supports the acceptance of
Hypothesis 2.
From Equations 2.6, we can see that the coefficients of foreign ownership (afob) have negative
signs and are significant at 5% level when only foreign ownership (afob) and GDP growth (gdpg) are
included in the formula. This indicates that with more foreign-owned banks in the sector, there are
fewer NPLs. As foreign owned banks have more standard corporate governance models and adhere to
the rule of prudential banking. This also provides evidence for the acceptance of Hypothesis 3.
However, when more variables are included in the formula, the coefficient of state-ownership
(asob) become insignificant.
The signs of other explaining variables are also reasonable. The "domestic credit to private sector"
(dcrepr) have positive coefficients significant at 5% and 1% levels. This means that more credit supply
will easily result in bad loans, especially without proper banking regulation and corporate governance
models. The enterprise restructuring (res) variable also has positive sign, which can be explained that
the restructuring process was accompanied by insolvencies of many enterprises, resulting in mounting
NPLs.
The possible problem with the regression is that, large amount of NPLs had been written off and
shifted from state-owned banks. This flaw in the NPL data might render the regressions less robust.
However, even though there were large amount of bad loan writing off during the late 1990s, we found
83
out that, based on the dataset, there were more positive growth of NPLs year-on-year in 1990s than in
2000s. In 2000s, there was few tranfer of NPLs, however, the NPLs stayed at a low and stable level,
compared to 1990s.
6.5.4. Other Empirical Testings on Credit Supply
Though the focus of empirical tests is on banking efficiency and ownership, there are other
attempts and findings from regression analysis, based on the data available.
As we managed to have collected "domestic credit to private sector" for 23 transition countries,
including CE, SEE, Baltics and CIS. We tested for the effects of ownership on credit supply. In order to
eliminate the impact of any large fluctuations in the macroeconomic variables during the 1990s, we
divided the sample period (1995–2007) into two sub-periods: consolidation period (1995–2001) which
is characterised by the completion of debt consolidation, recapitalisation of banks, and privatisation of
major banks. and post-consolidation period (2002–2007), which corresponds to the impacts of these
developments and changes on net interest margins in the transition process. The econometric analysis is
also applied separately for the 1990s and the 2000s.
The results presented in table 6.7 are reasonable, as for the first period, in fixed effects OLS model,
state-ownership and domestic credit to private sector has significant positive relation, which can be
explained by previous theories that, the lack of prudential banking in state-owned banks resulted in the
increase of credit supply. Besides, as seen from model 3.2, the GDP growth has no significant influence
over credit supply in the first period; while the state ownership has positive influence on credit supply
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in both model 3.1 and 3.2. This might hint the counter-cyclical lending behaviour of state-owned banks.
For the second period, as there are very few state-owned banks left during this period, no
significant relations were found between state-ownership (asob) and domestic credit (dcrepr). There is
large percentage of foreign bank presence, however, no significant relationship were found between
foreign ownership (afob) and domestic credit (dcrepr) either. No significant relations were found
between state ownership (asob) and domestic credit (dcrepr). On the other hand, when excluding those
ownership variables and adding other variables, we find that, bank concentration has negative effects
on banking credit while net interest margin has positive effects on credit supply. This could be
explained that, in the second period, banking lending behavior is approaching normal standard under
foreign ownership, thus credit supply are affected mainly by competition conditions and net interest
margin, instead of ownership conditions.
Table 6.7: Regression Analysis of effects on Domestic Credit to Private Sector
Dependent Variable: Domestic Credit to Private Sector(dcrepr)
Regressor 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6
Early Years (1995-2001) Later Years (2002-2007)
asob 0.1737***
(0.0528)
0.2366***
( 0.0733)
0.0228
(0.0778)
afob -0.0341
(0.0308)
0.0105
(0.0483)
gdpg 0.0092
(0.1345)
-0.3961*
(0.2275)
concentration -13.8610*
(8.0494)
netintmargin 167.2961**
(66.7209)
Constant 6.5946**
( 3.2830)
10.5043***
(2.6545)
15.8802
(1.2395)
19.2175*** 19.2736***
(2.8718)
21.6661***
(7.4063)
Country effects? yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time effects? yes yes yes yes yes yes
Adjusted R2 0.8525 0.8422 0.9300 0.8398 0.8397 0.8457
No. Of Obs 121 107 108 178 178 158
Source: Stata calculated results from the compiled data.
Notes: Standard errors in the parentheses.
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* Statistically significant at 10% level;
** Statistically significant at 5% level;
*** Statistically significant at 1% level.
6.6. Robustness Check
An important concern about the applicability of the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is the
potential problem of heteroskedasticity. If there is no constant variable in the error term, then the OLS
assumption will be violated. To check the heteroskedasticity of the respective regression specifications,
the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg tests have been carried out in the Stata after respective OLS
regressions to check the potential problem of heteroskedasticity. For the pooled OLS models, the Estat
hettest pvalues are larger than 0.05, which enables to accept the “H0: Constant Variance” for the
Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test at 95% confidence level. Therefore, there is no existence of
heteroskedasticity for the pooled OLS regressions.
Another important assumption of the regression model (OLS) that impact the validity of all tests (p,
t and F) is that residuals behave ‘normal’. Residuals are the difference between the observed values (Y)
and the predicted values. Kernel density estimate has been conducted and residuals behave close to
normal distribution.
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7. Lessons and Policy Implications for China
The CEE country's banking privatisation experiences have been given valuable lessons for the
world largest transition economy - China. The banking system in China is the largest and most complex
among the countries in transition from central planning to market-based economies. Even though China
started a remarkable reform process more than thirty years ago, long before CEE transition countries,
but it has followed an gradual approach to change and only started major reforms in banking sector
during the recent decade.
The China banking industry is still dominated by the big four state-owned commercial banks.
During the recent worldwide financial crisis, almost all major banking giants in the western world
suffered great losses; however, China's banks, supported by a series of government measures, recorded
a surge in growth in 2008 despite the global credit crisis.China's banks surprisingly soured to the top 5
places by market capitalisation and by pre-tax profits. (see Figure 7.1) This may create an illusion that
state-ownership might be useful and state-owned banks are more advantageous and powerful over
private banks. Therefore, questions arose such as should privatisation of state-owned banks still be the
best option for China? If so, should the big economy follow the useful lessons of CEE transition
economies? What measures can be adopted and what cannot, and why?
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Figure 7.1. World's Largest Bank Ranking by Market Capitalisation and by Pre-Tax Profit
Source: The Banker20
7.1. Review of Chinese Banking System
Prior to 1978, the year when the reform and opening up policy started, the same as other
communist central planning economies, a mono-bank model was dominant in the Chinese financial
system, whereby all banks were arranged as administrative hierarchy and controlled by People’s Bank
of China.
Though banking reform was put on the agenda as early as in 1978, the reform process has been
lasing for a long time and following a slow incremental path. The initial reform measures, which are
20 See http://www.thebanker.com, accessed on 13rd, Jul, 2009. It should be noted that the calculation of marketcap is based
on listed shares, but for state-owned banks, not all shares are listed. So the result is the market price of listed shares multiple
by total shares (including state shares). So the marketcap for Chinese state-owned banks are only the approximate estimates.
88
similar to CEE countries' methods, focused creating a two-tiered banking system out of the mono-bank
system. Banks then were expected to become more profit-oriented and diversified banking functions
were separated from the central bank - People’s Bank of China (PBOC). Four specialised state-owned
banks were created, which are the Bank of China (BOC), the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China
(ICBC), the Construction Bank of China (CBC) and the Agriculture Bank of China (ABC); they are
called the the ‘‘Big Four” state-owned commercial banks.
Banking ownership reform was not introduced until the mid- and late-1980s, during this period,
there was no radical change in the existing banking system structure. Nevertheless, some new private
banks had been established alongside with the ongoing dominant position of state-owned banks.
Furthermore, in order to remove the policy-oriented burden off the state-owned commercial banks, the
government established three specialised ‘‘policy” banks in 1994, namely the Agricultural
Development Bank of China (ADBC), China Development Bank (CDB), and the Export–Import Bank
of China (China Eximbank). In 1995, the Central Bank Law and the Commercial Bank Law were
enacted. With the implementation of the Commercial Bank Law, urban and rural credit cooperatives
started to merge and form city-level commercial banks, which are owned by the state, state-owned
enterprises, or in some cases private capital. (Xiaochi L., Yi Z., 2009)
In late 1990s, banking reform has been accelerated due to the WTO entry requirement and the
liberalisation of China banking industry. In order to prepare China banks to face the fierce competition
from global financial players, Chinese government made huge efforts in improving banking efficiency
and profitability. The bad debt problem is among the most urgent issues to be solved. Because of
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weakness inherent in the state-ownership of commercial banks, such as large policy loans and weak
corporate governance, NPLs are inevitable and have been receiving the most attention on the reform
agenda since the late 1990s.
Table 7.1: Estimates of Capital Injections Into the Big Three Since 1998
Source: Xiaochi L., Yi Z., (2009)
From Table 7.1, it is astonishing that, from 1998 to 2005, the Chinese government has injected
nearly 3000 billion RMB, which takes up 22 percent of total GDP in 2004, into the big three state-
owned banks. The AMC (Asset Management Companies)21 had been lending large sum of funds to
those banks. There are four AMCs, each one corresponding to one of the big four state owned banks.22
The inefficiency of those big state-owned banks had brought great costs to the government and the
economy overall.
21 AMC means "Assets Management Company", which is also called "Bad bank", is a term for a financial institution created to hold
nonperforming assets owned by a state guaranteed bank.
22 Bank of China’s AMC is called Dongfang. Cinda AMC is for China Construction Bank. Industrial and Commercial Bank had Hurong.
The Agriculture Bank of China has Great Wall.
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Figure 7.2. Aggregated NPL Ratio in the "Big Four" State-owned Banks
Source: Xiaochi L., Yi Z., (2009)
Figure 7.2 shows that the aggregated NPLs in percent of total loans and of GDP are very high
from 1997 to 2005. The huge decrease in 1998 is mainly because of the massive transfer of bad debts to
Asset Management Companies. After that, NPLs surged again, to the ratio as high as 32.9% of total
loans in 2000. In early 2000s, to prepare those big banks to be listed on the stock market, the
government continued shifting bad debts as well as diversified minority ownership of banks. Thus the
NPL ratio kept falling during this period.
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Figure7.3. NPLs of the "Big Four" State-owned Banks
Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream
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Figure 7.3 shows the NPL trend for each of the big four state-owned banks in China from 2000 to
2007. Except the Agriculture Banks, all other banks have shown great progress in reducing NPLs.
The improvement of NPL levels prepared for further reform of banks. Now all four state-owned
banks are listed on the stock market and a small percentage of shared were sold to foreign investors.
Other smaller banks were privatised using a mixture of methods. More than five domestic joint-equity
banks were publicly listed and another 10 banks were partially sold to foreign investors, including city
commercial banks and domestic joint-equity banks. Nowadays, there exists a three-tier domestic
banking system in China. The first tier consists of mainly of the "Big Four" state-owned banks and
other domestic banks; the second tier includes 12 national-level domestic joint-equity banks; the third
92
tier includes about 100 city-level commercial banks the third tier. The system also includes policy
banks, newly established Chinese-foreign joint-equity banks, banks capitalized entirely by foreign
funds, and other non-bank financial institutions such as urban and rural credit cooperatives, trust and
investment companies, finance companies, and leasing companies.
After reviewing the reform process, it can be argued that the outstanding performance of Chinese
banks during recent years is not an evidence of state-ownership advantage, but the ownership reform
measures government has taken. Alternatively, the weakness of state-ownership is still obvious during
the financial crisis. China banks stayed almost intact mainly because the relative isolation of Chinese
financial system from global financial markets, not particularly because of state-ownership. The growth
of China's banking sector is being driven by a huge increase in new lending (equivalent to 25% of
annual gross domestic product in the first six months of 2009.23 The recent credit boom exactly proves
the government's counter-cyclical controlling power of banking lending in state-owned banks in China,
which is against the rule of prudential banking and will highly likely result in NPLs in the future.
7.2. The Problems of Chinese State-Owned Banks
A recent study by Xiaochi Lin, Yi Zhang (2009) indicates that the "Big Four" state-owned
commercial banks are less profitable, are less efficient, and have worse asset quality than city-level
commercial banks, domestic joint-equity banks, newly established Chinese- foreign joint-equity banks,
and banks capitalized entirely by foreign funds.
23 www.thebankers.com accessed on 11 April, 2010
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The problems with Chinese state-owned banks are similar to what CEE banks used to have, such
as conflicts of political purposes and pure economic goals, soft budget constraints, ineffective
appointment of personnel and weak risk management.
Because of the government control power in commercial banks, the banking lending in China
shows a counter-cyclical trend. In good times, government tightened the credit supply for fear of
economy becoming overheating; however, in bad times, government stimulated credit to pull economy
out of cyclical downturn. During the recent crisis, China's massive credit stimulus will highly likely
lead to a future surge in non-performing loans. This build-up of bad debt may exacerbate China's
domestic imbalances and will only be cleared up at huge costs, which will ultimately fall on the low-
consuming households.
The key to solving the problem is to alter the ownership of commercial banks. However, it is not
easy in the context of China.
The most notable difference regarding state-owned banks is about State-Owned Enterprise (SOE)
privatisation. While CEE countries suffered greatly from related lending and poor corporate
governance of newly-privatised enterprises; China still keeps a certain number of state-owned
enterprises especially in strategically important industries, such as iron, oil and gas. Therefore the
government is reluctant to privatise state-owned banks as there is still the need to lend "policy" loans to
those state-owned enterprises.
7.3 The Rationale for Different Privatisation Methods
In the past two decades, Chinese state-owned banks have undergone a remarkable privatisation
program, which shares some similarities with CEE transition countries, but is still quite different. The
distinctions regarding the reform process can be explained by the differences in various economic,
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political and cultural factors.
The banking reform strategy contained in Pilot Guidelines rests on three pillars: (i) creation of
elementary governance bodies, (ii) invitation of foreign strategic investors and (iii) listing of banks at
Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKSE). It is inspired by international standards at least as much as the
regulatory reform strategy. (Z. Kudrna, 2008)
Factors that influence the differences in the privatization methods between CEE and China are
analysed as the following:
1. The privatisation results of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs)
The state-owned enterprise privatisation in China still needs further progress. China adopted a
"gradualist" approach to privatisation, which helped it to achieve spectacular economic growth. During
the early period of privatisation, the government focused on small SOEs and allowed liquidation of the
loss-making entities. However, there still remains the big SOEs in key industries indicating strong
government control and interests in strategic assets in the economy , which are difficult to fully
privatise. Thus the government has been progressing slowly on the path of fully privatising the state-
owned banks. The theoretical explanations of corporate governance problems applied to the early years
of privatisation in CEE countries are also applied here. As the state-owned enterprises have other
political and social aims instead of commercial pursuits, the business profits are hard to guarantee. The
big banks, which are also owned by the same government, would support those usually large state-
owned firms. Therefore, the credit supplied by state-owned banks could easily turn into non-
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performing loans. If those state-owned firms are not privatised, there will always be the incentive for
the government to keep the controlling stakes in commercial banks.
2. The government's position in the economy and ideological view of markets.
The political situation is quite different between CEE and China. Even though they are all transition
economies, but politically, China is still far from democracy. The special combination of economic
liberalisation and political authoritarianism determined the special path of banking sector reform.
3. The past, present, and potential future regulatory structure in the country
The regulatory structure in China had been quite inefficient but is making progress these years.
One attempt of the government to achieve better monitoring of the banking industry is the creation of
China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) in 2003 to oversee reforms and regulaions. (Xiaochi
L., Yi Z., 2009)
4. The cost of privatisation — the need to pay off important interest groups in the privatisation.
As the main legitimacy of Chinese government is constant economic growth, stability is the
primary goal and gradual reform is the optimal path of Chinese economic reform. The cost of
privatising and restructuring state-owned banks is very high and the result is still difficult to predict.
Thereof, fully privatising state-owned banks is too risky and costly in China's political economy
context.
5. Institution perfection.
The government's ability to credibly commit itself to respect investors' property rights after
divestiture is important for successful privatisation. The existing institutional framework for corporate
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governance in the country is also a key factor determining the time, methods and pace of banking
privatisation. Chinese government is putting great efforts in creating healthy institutional environment
for the huge market economy. China Banking Regulatory Commission is playing a greater role in
regulating and supervising Chinese banks besides the central bank.
6. The capital market conditions
Different from bank-based economies of CEE transition countries, China's stock market has
undergone great improvement and is working as good substitute of banking financing method. In order
to facilitate and promote the overall reforms of SOEs, the authorities permitted two stock exchanges to
be established in early 1990s, namely, the Shanghai Stock Exchange in 1990, and the Shenzhen Stock
Exchange in 1991. Since then, the equity issuance has been a popular financing method for the Chinese
firms. In this way, privatising banks domestically is a good option in China.
The quality of stock market also affects the reform methods of state-owned banks. For the Chinese
big four state-owned banks, three have been listed on the Hong Kong stock exchange. The HKSE,
more developed than its counterparts on the mainland, is a bigger and better-regulated market, where
all participants have to comply with the Code of Corporate Governance Practices. The expectations for
listing on HKSE is that it would help to sustain pressure for improvements in bank corporate
governance. The listing caused noticeable improvements in transparency.
7. The government's unwillingness to sell large percentage of shares to foreign strategic investors
The most notable difference between CEE countries and China is their willingness towards foreign
ownership of domestic banks. China is certainly learning from CEE experiences by selling minority
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shares of domestic banks (including state-owned banks) to international big players. Several
international banks have taken on minority stakes in the Big Four. However, Chinese government set a
limit for foreign ownership in state-owned banks at 20%. Moreover, There are no representatives of
strategic investors below board level with the exception of a few consultants working on new product
lines and staff training. The day to day management, credit approval, risk management and other
essential functions remain firmly in the hands of managers appointed and monitored by the Chinese
shareholders. (Z. Kudrna, 2008)
The benefits of foreign bank involvement have been tested and confirmed. Recently, Chinese
Banking Regulation Commission (CBRC) examined the changes of the Chinese banks which
introduced foreign investors and found that the foreign strategic investors have been playing an active
and positive role in improving the Chinese banks’ corporate governance, cost control, risk management,
operation technologies, and growth sustainability. (Xiaochi L., Yi Z., 2009) The document, “Chinese
Banking Sector’s Reform and Opening, and New Progress of Regulations,” issued by CBRC on Dec 5,
2005 further details the major problem associated with state ownership in the banking sector is that the
lack of incentives in monitoring state banks create “black holes” especially with regards to corporate
governance.24 CBRC’s perspective here could be that despite an imitation of investment by foreign
entities, it still likely that such association will improve Chinese banks’ performance from increased
incentive of monitoring by outside owners as well as by the exposure to new ideas, modern technology
transfer, and other advanced banking skills. Additionally, the foreign investment in equity holdings of
24 CBRC website http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/english/home/jsp/index.jsp, accessed on 10th, May, 2010
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these Chinese banks, especially the associated foreign buyers' commitment of better human capital,
increased monitoring and technology transfer has strongly reinforced the credit worthiness of these
banks as evidenced by the recent upgrade of credit ratings by international credit rating agencies, such
as S&P (Li, 2005).
Despite the progress brought by minority foreign shareholdings, Chinese government will not
willingly nor necessarily privatise state-owned banks by totally relying on foreign owners. The reasons
include cultural differences, geographical politics and potential economic risks. Because of cultural
traditions and lack of investment channels, both private and corporate savings in China are
exceptionally high. Thus the banking sector is crucial for economic development of China. Any form
of banking crisis would threaten steady economic development and security of jobs on a massive scale.
That could easily destabilise the communist party rule that derives legitimacy largely from sustained
growth and improvement of economic circumstances. (Kudrna, 2008)
To summarise, only the basic format of standard bank governance has been achieved in Chinese
banking reform. Banks have been turned into corporate bodies, where foreign investors are allowed to
participate at a certain level and three of the big four SOBs are listed on A- and H-markets. (The last
one to be listed soon.) Those efforts of banking reform have resulted in substantial enhancement of
bank performance, especially regarding NPLs and efficiency. Nevertheless, fundamental change in
ownership from state to private still faces great obstacles. The periphery role of foreign strategic
investors in banking governance and management greatly prevented SOBs from benefiting from
banking FDI in a similar way as CEE transition economies. As the dominance of state ownership
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persists, when there is any conflict of interests between government and private shareholders, the
power of the state prevails. Besides, the government is basically dominated by the single party, thus the
party also controls over the personnel nomination, which ensures that policy objectives will be
followed.
To strengthen one point again, the paper is not to argue against the policy aims of state in banks,
but rather to support the importance that there should be clearer separation of policy banks and
commercial banks, as the incentives of government are not always accord with banking efficiency, but
most of the time conflict with standard prudential rules of banking. Even though China has established
several policy and development banks for certain national strategic sectors, there is still large influence
of the government on the commercial banks lending, through the channel of the state-ownership in the
biggest four banks.
After considering the various factors influencing privatisating methods, we can conclude that the
optimal policy choice for China is that, firstly, progress SOE privatisation; secondly, privatising banks
based on a sound and well-functioning stock market; thirdly, improve corporate governance and
advanced banking technology by certain acceptable degree of foreign bank participation.
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8. Conclusions
Central and Eastern Europe is the region where the ownership of banks has been through the most
fundamental and massive changes during the past two decades.
The governments had ceded direct ownership of commercial banks, and sold large amount of
shares to foreign banks. Large literature has analysed the banking privatisation process and the general
disadvantages of state-owned banks. This paper adds value to the existing literature by analysing the
state-ownership in commercial banks in transition process, whether and why state ownership imposes
negative effects on commercial banking, through both theories of corporate governance and empirical
testings. It contributes to the rethinking of state-ownership in commercial banks, draws implications for
China based on CEE experience, and provides some insights into how state-owned banks can be
transformed into well-functioning financial institutions which are crucial for achieving greater financial
intermediation and economic development in transition countries.
The main conclusions are the following:
First, in the context of transition country privatisation process, the state ownership of banks
imposes negative effects on bank performance and hinders successful privatisation of enterprises.
Through the perspective of corporate governance view (including corporate governance issues both in
banks and newly-privatised enterprises), in the special transitory corporate governance model in newly
privatised firms in CEE countries, the state-owned banks, because of their internal flaw of incentives,
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lack of standard banking practices, and complicated abnormal relationships with their current or
potential clients, were unable to allocate credit to the proper clients, thus generated large non-
performing loans and jeopardised banking efficiency.
Second, by means of SFA method, we find out that banking production efficiency has been
improving greatly in late 1990s and stayed at a constant high level in 2000s. Through second stage
panel data pooled OLS and fixed effects OLS regressions, we find the negative effects of "asset share
of state-owned banks in total assets" on overall banking production efficiency score calculated , and
asset quality (in terms of NPLs). Besides, the large presence of state-owned banks is also associated
with domestic credit boom in late 1990s, due to the non-prudential lending behaviours.
Third, as supported by both theories and empirical testings, foreign bank participation proves to be
useful and the only viable option for most CEE countries. It cut off related lending and caused a
fundamental change of corporate governance models and transformed CEE banks into western style
modern financial institutions guided by prudential banking rules. The empirical tests also confirmed
that foreign bank participation improves bank performance.
Next, the giving up of state ownership in banks does not mean the insignificance of government's
role in the banking sector. Government should position itself in the right place. The most crucial role of
governments in banking is the strong and independent regulation and supervision over the banking
industry. Therefore, for transition countries, the transformed role of government from owners to
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regulators is an extremely important determinant in the success of not only banking privatisation but
also banking development afterwards.
Finally, this paper draws policy implications for China, based on CEE experience. For Chinese
banking transformation, the key is still about the ownership change. This paper argues that the
outstanding performance of Chinese banks during recent years is not an evidence of state-ownership
advantage, but the ownership reform measures the government has taken. Alternatively, the weakness
of state-ownership is still obvious during the financial crisis. The recent credit boom exactly proves the
government's counter-cyclical controlling power of banking lending in state-owned banks in China,
which is against the rule of prudential banking and will highly likely result in NPLs in the future. Based
on the similarities and differences between CEE and China, the paper proposed future banking reform
measures for China.
Turning back to the doubts over the nationalisation of some western banks during the financial
crisis starting from 2007. We should not confuse the two different situations in which the banks are
under government control: One is because the current or previous regime maintains near-complete
control of all businesses in a country, which is what this paper aims to study, in the context of transition
and privatisation; the other situation is during severely difficult economic crisis, bank nationalisation is
largely used as an emergency method to help banks avoid immediate insolvency and to solve the
pressing problem of potential systematic risks. Thus, during the current crisis, bank nationalisation is
only a temporary measure, and most nationalised banks during the period are expected to be privatised
after the economy recovers.
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For further research, the role of government as a regulator and supervisor over banking sector can
be further analysed in greater depth. Besides, after obtaining the bank-level ownership data across
sample years, both in CEE countries and in China, a comparative study could be a good suggestion.
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Appendix:
Table A1: Average Banking Production Efficiency Estimates for individual country each year
TCentral
Europe (CE)
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Czech
Republic 0.001937 0.304163 0.377863 0.575378 0.862723 0.917996 0.970052 0.973877 0.982812 0.966945 0.979273 0.976048
Hungary 0.000001 0.178328 0.269374 0.775257 0.962407 0.916350 0.969856 0.973735 0.982759 0.966721 0.979200 0.975948
Poland 0.313545 0.394020 0.452460 0.655089 0.823006 0.919319 0.970247 0.974031 0.982876 0.967182 0.979373 0.976193
Slovak
Republic 0.000545 0.287075 0.366179 0.695354 0.962670 0.917879 0.970027 0.973859 N/A 0.966926 0.979264 0.976037
Slovenia 0.051985 0.315592 0.387921 0.595392 0.862766 0.918037 0.970047 0.973898 0.982817 0.966952 0.979269 0.976043
CE average 0.073603 0.295836 0.370759 0.659294 0.894714 0.917916 0.970046 0.973880 0.982816 0.966945 0.979276 0.976054
Southeastern Europe (SEE) and Baltics
Bulgaria 0.005137 0.245466 0.344009 0.675327 0.762604 0.917389 0.969966 0.973823 0.982790 0.966863 0.979245 0.976023
Croatia 0.200566 0.377828 0.442811 0.675470 0.762936 0.919198 0.970218 0.974015 0.982864 0.967137 0.979354 0.976156
Estonia 0.000169 0.259150 0.355911 0.575338 0.862617 0.917646 0.969999 0.973851 0.982795 0.966896 0.979249 0.976021
Latvia 0.000082 0.239665 0.254906 0.975318 0.962602 0.917541 0.969995 0.973835 0.982793 0.966881 0.979243 0.976018
Lithuania 0.000119 0.257944 0.339860 0.675304 0.862583 0.917520 0.969978 0.973844 0.982801 0.966926 0.979259 0.976038
Romania 0.000040 0.265459 0.342659 0.615325 0.762584 0.917446 0.969986 0.973833 N/A 0.966883 0.979257 0.976028
SEE average 0.034352 0.274252 0.346693 0.698680 0.829321 0.917790 0.970024 0.973867 0.982809 0.966931 0.979268 0.976047
Source: Author's own calculation.
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1. Variables Regarding Financial Development and Structure
Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, (2000) Constructed a "New Database on Financial Development
and Structure", and it was recently updated in Nov. 2008. Based on several trustworthy sources, it
provides a comprehensive assessment of the development, structure and performance of the financial
sector. Especially useful to our research is that, this database uses bank-specific data to construct
indicators of the market structure and efficiency of commercial banks. Furthermore, it is the first
systematic compilation of data which splits public from private ownership in the banking sector.
Based on the introduction paper of Beck,T. Demirgüç-Kunt,A. and Levine,R. (2000), we classify
those variables into four sections as following:
A. Size of Financial Institutions
The data base distinguishes three groups of financial institutions: central banks, deposit money banks
and other financial institutions. Based on IMF's International Financial Statistics (IFS), it measures
both relative size and absolute size of each group of financial institutions. These measures provide
evidence on the importance of the financial services performed by the three types of financial
institutions relative to the size of the economy. Those measures are:
-Deposit Money Bank Assets / (Deposit Money + Central) Bank Assets (code: dbacba); - Deposit
Money Bank Assets / GDP (code: dbagdp);
- Other Financial Institutions Assets / GDP (code: ofagdp)
B. Activity of Financial Intermediaries:
As one of the main function of financial intermediaries is channeling savings to investors.
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- Private Credit by Deposit Money Banks to GDP (code: pcrdbgdp)
- Private Credit by Deposit Money Banks and Other Financial Institutions to GDP(code: pcrdbofg)
Both measures isolate credit issued to the private sector as opposed to credit issued to governments and
public enterprises. Furthermore, they concentrate on credit issued by intermediaries other than the
central bank.
- Bank Credit / Bank Deposits (bcbd)
- Bank Deposits / GDP (bdgdp)
C. Efficiency and profitability of Commercial Banks
Besides the production efficiency estimator created originally in the previous section, this database
also provides some alternative aggregated measures of bank efficiency and profitability, which is also
based on Bankscope database and individual country sources such as central bank and supervisory
body publications.
Measures of Efficiency
- Net interest margin (coded: netintmargin):equals the accounting value of a bank's net interest
revenue as a share of its total assets.
- Overhead cost (code: overhead):equals the accounting value of a bank's overhead costs as share of its
total assets.
Measures of Profitability:
- ROE: Bank return on Equity (coded: roe)
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- ROA: Bank Return on Assets (coded: roa)
D. Measures of Market Structure
- Bank Concentration ratio (coded: concentration)
It is defined as the ratio of the three largest banks' assets to total banking sector assets.
As pointed out by Beck,T. Demirgüç-Kunt,A. and Levine,R. (2000), a highly concentrated commercial
banking sector might result in lack of competitive pressure to attract savings and channel them
efficiently to investors; while a highly fragmented market might be evidence for undercapitalised
banking sector.
2. EBRD data
From EBRD website, we obtained the crucial data for country-level aggregated variables of
ownership, asset quality, privatisation index and domestic credit. (see EBRD website)
A. Ownership
The problem is that bankscope only collects the ownership information from the most recent
accounting year.
- Asset share of state-owned banks (in per cent) (code: asob)
It measures the share of majority state-owned banks’ assets in total bank sector assets. The definition of
state here includes the federal, regional and municipal levels, as well as the state property fund and the
state pension fund. State-owned banks are defined as banks with state ownership exceeding 50 per cent,
end-of-year. (Source: EBRD survey of central banks.)
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- Asset share of foreign-owned banks (in per cent) (code: afob)
It measures the share of total bank sector assets in banks with foreign ownership exceeding 50 per
cent, end-of-year. Source: EBRD survey of central banks.
- Number of banks (foreign-owned)
It shows the number of commercial and savings banks, excluding cooperative banks. Foreign-
owned banks are defined as those with foreign ownership exceeding 50 per cent, end-of-year. Source:
EBRD survey of central banks.
B. Asset Quality:
Non-performing loans (in per cent of total loans) (code: npl)
It measures the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans. Non-performing loans include sub-
standard, doubtful and loss classification categories of loans, but excludes loans transferred to a state
rehabilitation agency or consolidation bank, end-of-year. Source: EBRD survey of central banks.
C. Privatisation index
Table 6.2 Privatisation index
Index Large-scale privatisation
(code: lspri)
Governance and enterprise
restructuring(Code: res)
Banking reform and interest rate
liberalisation(code:breform)
1 Little private ownership. Soft budget constraints (lax credit and
subsidy policies weakening financial
discipline at the enterprise level); few other
reforms to promote corporate governance.
Little progress beyond establishment
of a two-tier system;.
2 Comprehensive scheme almost
ready for implementation; some
sales completed.
Moderately tight credit and subsidy policy,
but weak enforcement of bankruptcy
legislation and little action taken to
strengthen competition and corporate
governance.
Significant liberalization of interest
rates and credit allocation; limited use
of directed credit or interest rate
ceilings.
3 More than 25 percent of large-
scale enterprise assets in private
hands or in the process of being
privatised (with the process
having reached a stage at which
Significant and sustained actions to harden
budget constraints and to promote corporate
governance effectively (for example,
privatisation combined with tight credit and
subsidy policies and/or enforcement of
Substantial progress in establishment
of bank solvency and of a framework
for prudential supervision and
regulation; full interest rate
liberalization with little preferential
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the state has effectively ceded its
ownership rights), but possibly
with major unresolved issues
regarding corporate governance.
bankruptcy legislation). access to cheap refinancing,
significant lending to private
enterprises and significant presence of
private banks.
4 More than 50 percent of state-
owned enterprise and farm assets
in private ownership and
significant progress with
corporate governance of these
enterprises.
Substantial improvement in corporate
governance and significant new investment
at the enterprise level, including minority
holdings by financial investors.
Significant movement of banking laws
and regulations towards BIS
standards, well-functioning banking
competition and effective prudential
supervision, significant term lending
to private enterprises, substantial
financial deepening.
4+ Standards and performance
typical of advanced industrial
economies: more than 75 per cent
of enterprise assets in private
ownership with effective
corporate governance.
Standards and performance typical of
advanced industrial economies: effective
corporate control exercised through
domestic financial institutions and markets,
fostering market-driven restructuring.
Standards and performance norms of
advanced industrial economies, full
convergence of banking laws and
regulations with BIS standards,
provision of full set of competitive
banking services.
Source: compiled based on EBRD transition indicators description.
D. Banking credit
- Domestic credit to private sector (in per cent of GDP)
Ratio of total outstanding bank credit to private sector at end-of-year, including households and
enterprises, to GDP.
Source: EBRD survey of central banks.
- Domestic credit to households (in per cent of GDP)
Ratio of total outstanding bank credit to households, at end-of-year, to GDP.
Source: EBRD survey of central banks.
3: Macroeconomic variables:
Macroeconomic variables such as Inflation and GDP growth are collected from EBRD statistics.
